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UNDERENFORCEMENT AS UNEQUAL 
PROTECTION 
DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER* 
Abstract: Rape law is largely underenforced. Yet criticism of policing practices 
has myopically focused on enforcement excesses, thus overlooking the problem 
of the state withholding protective resources. This neglect is particularly trou-
bling where sexual violence is at issue. Empirical evidence demonstrates the op-
eration of pervasive biases in police officers’ decisions not to pursue an investi-
gation. Over time, law enforcement officers have discriminated against rape vic-
tims with immunity. Recently, however, this has changed. This Article is the first 
to describe a new effort by the United States Department of Justice to hold law 
enforcement officers accountable for failing to protect victims of sexual assault. 
In important respects, this turn is unprecedented. But insofar as the latest devel-
opments target violence without redress, the assertion of federal power in this 
domain possesses a venerable historical pedigree. When the Equal Protection 
Clause was conceived, the framers were chiefly concerned with the states’ failure 
to provide black citizens with protection from private violence. After passage of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the “protection model” of equal protection, along 
with the federal power to enforce it, lay dormant. Recent events have revived this 
model and this power, allowing us to glimpse a modern version of what the 39th 
Congress intended. The Justice Department’s latest deployment of its “pattern or 
practice” enforcement authority may come as close as any intervention since Re-
construction to addressing the framers’ core concern with underenforcement. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s divergent jurisprudential framework, the 
original meaning of equal protection has begun to resurface. 
INTRODUCTION 
The excesses of criminal justice are problems of growing national preoc-
cupation.1 A primary, and increasingly visible, challenge is to practices of dis-
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criminatory over-policing.2 Whether manifested in the decision to stop, to 
search, to arrest, or to employ (sometimes lethal) force, police bias exerts a 
powerful and pernicious influence. This reality is now recognized as among 
the pressing problems of our time.3 
In contrast, discriminatory under-policing receives scant attention.4 As is 
true of underenforcement generally,5 under-policing tends to result from a de-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Bill Keller, Prison Revolt, NEW YORKER (June 29, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/06/29/prison-revolt [https://perma.cc/CF3M-2RLY]. As Bill Keller notes, “These 
days, it is hard to ignore a rising conservative clamor to rehabilitate the criminal-justice system.” Id. 
Keller continues: 
In Congress and the states, conservatives and liberals have found common ground on 
such issues as cutting back mandatory-minimum sentences; using probation, treatment, 
and community service as alternatives to prison for low-level crimes; raising the age of 
juvenile-court jurisdictions; limiting solitary confinement; curtailing the practice of 
confiscating assets; rewriting the rules of probation and parole to avoid sending offend-
ers back to jail on technicalities; restoring education and job training in prisons; allow-
ing prisoners time off for rehabilitation; and easing the reëntry of those who have 
served time by expunging some criminal records and by lowering barriers to employ-
ment, education, and housing. 
Id. 
 2 Over-policing constitutes just one component of the contemporary criminal justice critique. 
Perhaps the dominant strand focuses on sentencing; in particular, on mass incarceration rates that 
disproportionately affect communities of color. Increasingly, attention to punishment also encom-
passes the collateral consequences that attend a conviction. The criminal justice system’s treatment of 
misdemeanors is yet another important area of reform efforts. For a fine-grained analysis of the over-
use of the criminal justice system, see generally Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L. J. 
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., at iii (2015). 
 3 See Ronald Weitzer, American Policing Under Fire: Misconduct and Reform, 52 SOCIETY 475, 
475 (2015). As Ronald Weitzer explained, 
A cluster of recent police killings of African American men has sparked an unprece-
dented amount of public debate regarding policing in the United States. Critics and pro-
testers have made sweeping allegations about the police; a presidential commission has 
been formed to study police misconduct; and reforms are being debated. . . . This is a 
fairly unique moment in American history. 
Id.; see also Nick Wing, 16 Numbers That Explain Why Police Reform Became an Even Bigger Story 
in 2015, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 29, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-
reform-numbers-2015_us_5672e150e4b0688701dc7a54 [https://perma.cc/Z7LN-JJM4] (discussing 
the police killings, mainly of African American men, that occurred in 2015). 
 4 See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2006) (explain-
ing the relationship between “under-policing” and “underenforcement”); see also William J. Stuntz, 
Accountable Policing 14 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 130, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=886170 [https://perma.cc/9GNR-NS56] (“[T]he failure [to address 
underenforcement] is more serious than most of the legal issues scholars debate, partly because un-
derpolicing makes all other regulatory problems worse.”) (alteration in original). 
 5 See Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1716 (“[U]nderenforcement has been given short shrift, particu-
larly in the area of street and violent crime.”). Underenforcement involves “a weak state response to 
lawbreaking as well as to victimization.” Id. at 1717. Alexandra Natapoff is one of the few scholars to 
analyze a range of underenforcement practices outside the white-collar context. See id. at 1716. As I 
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valuing of the harms caused by a specific crime, the harms suffered by mem-
bers of a certain demographic group, or both. When the protection of the state 
is withheld for reasons stemming from bias, underenforcement—specifically 
under-policing6—implicates core constitutional norms. 
The widespread neglect of underenforcement in both scholarly and popu-
lar discourses is therefore especially troubling. The conventional story tells 
that the remedy for too much policing is always less policing; if the former is 
important, the latter cannot be a worry. This version, however,  is overly sim-
plistic. A more comprehensive account, and the one I advance here, acknowl-
edges underenforcement and overenforcement as related problems.7 Both un-
derenforcement and overenforcement manifest the state’s implementation of its 
police power in ways that disadvantage the most vulnerable among us.8 On 
this view, underenforcement and overenforcement together undermine equal 
protection norms.9 
                                                                                                                           
will argue, the rubric of “underenforcement” includes “under-policing”—policing that, due to the 
operation of systemic biases, falls below an optimal level. 
 6 Although this discussion centers on policing, many of its arguments apply to prosecution. Un-
derenforcement directly implicates prosecution, and perhaps under narrower circumstances, even the 
functioning of judges and juries. Nonetheless, policing raises a unique set of concerns. Moreover, 
because a police investigation can, and often does, terminate the criminal process at the outset, polic-
ing is an obvious starting point for consideration of the dynamics and impact of underenforcement. Cf. 
Identifying and Preventing Gender Bias in Law Enforcement Response to Sexual Assault and Domes-
tic Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3 (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/799476/
download [https://perma.cc/994N-9CDH] [hereinafter Gender Bias in Law Enforcement]. The Justice 
Department noted: 
In the sexual assault and domestic violence context, if gender bias influences the initial 
response to or investigation of the alleged crime, it may compromise law enforcement’s 
ability to ascertain the facts, determine whether the incident is a crime, and develop a 
case that supports effective prosecution and holds the perpetrator accountable. 
Id. 
 7 See Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1719 (observing that underenforcement “is not necessarily an 
alternative to overenforcement but often its corollary”); see also infra notes 133–135 and accompany-
ing text. 
 8 Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1719. Natapoff explained:  
[U]nderenforcement is one way the state participates in social contests over resources, 
power, and legitimacy by staying its enforcement hand in selective ways. Because the 
losers in these contests are those who cannot command the state’s full support, underen-
forcement reveals important facets of the distributive and normative operations of the 
criminal system.  
Id. See generally Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Crimi-
nal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211 (2015) (challenging the notion that criminalization is 
the appropriate solution for addressing crimes against minorities). 
 9 This Article advances a conceptual framework that rests on constitutional underpinnings. It is 
also the case, however, that protection from private violence constitutes a civil right. See Robin West, 
Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY 98 (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen Katz, eds., 2014) (observing that “[t]he 
thoroughly positive right to thoroughly positive, state-provided protection against thoroughly private 
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In underenforced arenas,10 the criminal justice system withholds its pro-
tective resources from groups deemed unworthy of protection. Evidence of this 
dynamic can be found across a range of law enforcement responses, including 
black-on-black homicide,11 hate crimes,12 and unlawful police violence against 
civilians.13 In each of these categories, failures of criminal justice can be at-
tributed, not to too much enforcement, but to too little. In turn, underenforce-
ment both evinces and perpetuates vexing relations between the state and 
members of groups granted only limited protection from violence.14 
Unremedied injuries suffered by women, in particular, have historically 
been the norm,15 just as gender bias has long been an intractable feature of our 
criminal justice landscape.16 Across the spectrum of violence—domestic17 and 
                                                                                                                           
violence is a—maybe the—quintessential civil right: it is a right that can only be realized through the 
enactment of positive law and its fair enforcement”). The implications of a civil rights-based under-
standing of underenforcement merit separate consideration. 
 10 The focus throughout this discussion remains on the underenforcement side of systemic bias. 
As will become apparent, my claims regarding equal protection also have purchase on the overen-
forcement side although I do not develop the argument for reforms that shrink the criminal justice 
system overall or that specifically target inequities in incarceration and the collateral consequences of 
conviction. 
 11 See generally JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015) 
(examining the disproportionate rate of murdered African American men in the United States). 
 12 See generally Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858 (2014) (ana-
lyzing how prosecutors implement hate crime laws). 
 13 See Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the Margins—Addressing Hidden 
Forms of Bias and the Politics of Which Lives Matter, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 711, 714 (2015). As 
Barnes explains, the Black Lives Matter movement arose to 
challeng[e] the perceived injustice surrounding these unnecessary deaths and proclaim 
the societal worth of those who were killed. The campaign adopted the tagline “Black 
Lives Matter.” The message of the phrase is obvious: only in a society where Blacks are 
considered to be of low social value could their deaths under such circumstances rou-
tinely result in neither criminal prosecution nor civil sanction. 
Id. (alteration in original); see also Editorial, Voters Tell Prosecutors, Black Lives Matter, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/opinion/voters-tell-prosecutors-black-lives-
matter.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4DB2-NURY] (describing the electoral defeats of two incumbent 
prosecutors perceived to have mishandled cases involving police killings of unarmed black citizens). 
 14 See Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1717 (asserting that underenforcement “offers important insights 
into the government’s relationship with vulnerable groups in the context of the criminal system”). 
 15 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 5 (1987). For example:  
Since 1970, feminists have uncovered a vast amount of sexual abuse of women by men. 
Rape, battery, sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children, prostitution, and pornogra-
phy, seen for the first time in their true scope and interconnectedness, form a distinctive 
pattern: the power of men over women in society. These abuses are as allowed de facto 
as they are prohibited de jure. 
Id. 
 16 See Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 3 n.2. The Justice Department noted 
that:  
2016] Rape Law Underenforcement 1291 
sexual18—substantive law reform has not readily translated into law enforce-
ment.19 Instead, to this day, the same biases reflected in repudiated legal re-
gimes continue to influence the implementation of more progressive laws that 
have emerged in their stead.20 
Rape law’s enforcement gap is the focus of the remaining discussion, 
which proceeds from the premise that effective policing serves a number of 
valuable functions.21 The discussion also develops the idea that a duty to pro-
                                                                                                                           
[G]ender bias—both explicit and implicit—exists throughout society, and as a result, it 
can arise in various aspects of the criminal justice system. Explicit and implicit gender 
bias can undermine the effective handling of sexual assault and domestic violence cases 
at any point from report to adjudication or closure. 
Id.; see also infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (discussing the intersectional nature of gen-
der bias). 
 17 The example of domestic violence is instructive: 
Until recently, privacy-based rationales for non-intervention in domestic crimes saturat-
ed the criminal justice system at all levels—police, prosecutors and bench. Confronting 
a legal apparatus wholly unresponsive to battering, domestic violence advocates fo-
cused their reform efforts, quite sensibly, on forcing police and prosecutors to enforce 
the laws already on the books; that is, to treat crimes “equally” whether the victim and 
perpetrator were strangers or intimates. Proponents of mandatory arrest and “no drop” 
prosecution policies argued that constraining law enforcement discretion would tend to 
result in fuller enforcement of existing substantive criminal laws. 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize 
Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 970–71 (2004); see also Cheryl Hanna, No 
Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1849, 1856 n.24 (1996) (noting that “state response to battering, particularly in the criminal 
system, has been rooted primarily in gender discrimination”). For a discussion of the federal funding 
implications of discriminatory local policing of domestic violence, see Rachel A. Harmon, Federal 
Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U L. REV. 870, 913–15 (2015). Interestingly, im-
portant parallels between domestic and sexual violence are dwarfed by their divergent treatment in 
both state and federal justice systems—a subject worth further exploration. 
 18 According to the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, ninety percent of all cases 
of rape involve female victims. MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994–2010, at 3 (2013). Although the data 
on violence against transgender individuals is sparse, “community-based studies indicate high levels 
of victimization” of transgender individuals. Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 5. 
 19 See infra notes 25–65 and accompanying text. 
 20 Cf. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE 
L. J. 2117, 2119 (1996) (“When the legitimacy of a status regime is successfully contested, lawmakers 
and jurists will both cede and defend status privileges—gradually relinquishing the original rules and 
justificatory rhetoric of the contested regime and finding new rules and reasons to protect such status 
privileges as they choose to defend.”). It is useful to notice that the underenforcement of “new rules” 
can likewise function to protect status privileges. 
 21 Policing involves ascertaining the facts in order to determine whether probable cause exists to 
believe that a crime has been committed. If so, effective policing entails building a case that enables 
prosecutors to hold the perpetrator accountable. See infra notes 267–283 and accompanying text (de-
tailing how the Justice Department’s guidance on reducing gender bias could result in better policing); 
see also Ta-Nehisi Coates, Bill Cosby and His Enablers, ATLANTIC (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/bill-cosby-and-his-enablers/422448/ [https://perma.cc/E7FR-
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tect equally is constitutionally mandated. Part I documents the operation of 
gender bias in police responses to sexual assault.22 Part II traces the changing 
meaning of equal protection as it pertains to discriminatory policing, showing 
that underenforcement was central to what the 39th Congress intended the 
Equal Protection Clause to redress.23 Notwithstanding this historical pedigree, 
equal protection jurisprudence has evolved to effectively foreclose “failure to 
protect” claims. Part III explains how the Justice Department has recently re-
invigorated the federal obligation to hold police departments accountable for 
providing unequal protection.24 A conclusion addresses the implications of this 
new enforcement paradigm for the policing of sexual assault and beyond. 
I. RAPE LAW ON THE GROUND 
A majority of sexual assault victims never relate the occurrence of the 
crime to law enforcement officials.25 According to recent Justice Department 
estimates, females ages eighteen to twenty-four,26 the population most vulner-
able to sexual assault,, reported to police at rates of only twenty percent for 
college students and thirty-two percent for non-college students.27 Research 
                                                                                                                           
TDFK] (“Criminals flourish when no credible system exists to adjudicate the claims of their vic-
tims.”); cf. Harmon, supra note 17, at 913 (observing, in the domestic violence context, that arrests 
not only channel cases to the prosecutorial stage of the criminal process, but can also deter further 
violence and serve a symbolic function). 
 22 See infra notes 25–65 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 66–118 and accompanying text. As Part II will describe, the failure of state and 
local law enforcement officials to protect blacks from white violence in the South was a primary im-
petus for enacting the Equal Protection Clause. See infra notes 68–83 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 119–283 and accompanying text. 
 25 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN SURVEY 33 (2006) (reporting that, among rape victims, 19.1%  of adult women and 12.9% of 
adult men reported the crime to police); see David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal 
Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1222 (1997) (suggesting that “unreported rapes 
are, disproportionately, acquaintance rapes”). 
 26 See SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 
VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995–2013, 1, 5 (2014) (finding that “[f]or the 
period 1995–2013, females ages eighteen to twenty-four had the highest rate of rape and sexual as-
sault victimizations compared to females in all other age groups,” and that “[c]ollege-age male victims 
accounted for seventeen percent of rape and sexual assault victimizations against students and four 
percent against nonstudents”). 
 27 Id. Women of color, both on and off campus, may be even less likely to report sexual assault 
than their white counterparts. See Colleen Murphy, Another Challenge on Campus Sexual Assault: 
Getting Minority Students to Report It, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 18, 2015), http://chronicle.com/
article/Another-Challenge-on-Campus/230977 [https://perma.cc/C68R-YQ5R] (describing the report-
ing gap between white college women and college women of color and positing that the “layers of 
privilege” required to pursue a complaint through the college administrative process are often less 
available to minority students). As one commentator has observed, an “impossible hierarchy of ac-
ceptable victimhood,” means that “black women who walk willingly into the rooms of men they call 
‘brother’ are considered undeserving of protection from any violence that happens therein.” Hannah 
2016] Rape Law Underenforcement 1293 
suggests that one reason (though certainly not the only reason28) is the predict-
ability of a non-response.29 Among non-students, nearly one in five surveyed 
did not report the rape because “police would not or could not do anything to 
help.”30 Other studies further indicate that rape survivors are foregoing reliance 
on the criminal justice system in anticipation of how their case will be 
(mis)treated.31 
In many jurisdictions, the widespread perception that law enforcement of-
ficers will likely not pursue allegations of rape is entirely accurate.32 Police 
inaction is a particularly acute problem in cases involving women of color, 
                                                                                                                           
Giorgis, Many Women of Color Don’t Go to the Police After Sexual Assault for a Reason, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/women-of-
color-police-sexual-assault-racist-criminal-justice [https://web.archive.org/web/20160418215410/
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/women-of-color-police-sexual-assault-
racist-criminal-justice]. There are additional reasons for women of color to avoid reporting rapes to 
police: 
If we report our assaults to police, we risk being retraumatized . . . by the violence of 
the criminal justice system itself, which treats rape victims like suspects. Worse yet, the 
police themselves commit assault with impunity; often, they target black women in par-
ticular, knowing our existence at the intersections of racism and misogyny make crimes 
against us far less likely to be investigated. To be “a good rape victim” is to immediate-
ly report your assault to the police (even knowing you will likely never see “justice”), 
but to be a good black person is to avoid the police entirely because your life quite lit-
erally depends on it. The tightrope walk is impossible. 
Id. 
 28 See Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of 
Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 465, 473–81 (2005) (discussing the civil legal needs that 
tend to impact victims of sexual violence, including privacy, immigration status, medical care and 
counseling, protective orders, safe housing, education, employment, and financial stability); see also 
infra note 33 and accompanying text (urging an intersectional understanding of what equal protection 
requires). 
 29 See SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 26, at 9. 
 30 Id. This same concern was expressed by survivors of sexual assault in testimony to Congress, 
ultimately leading to passage of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”). See Victoria Nourse, 
Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights 
Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9–12 (1996). 
 31 Nourse, supra note 30, at 9–12; Kimberly Hefling, Justice Department: Majority of Campus 
Sexual Assault Goes Unreported to Police, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/rundown/four-five-acts-campus-sexual-assault-go-unreported-police/ [https://perma.cc/
J3BJ-XS7G] (explaining the massive underreporting of campus rape as significantly attributable to the 
fact that victims “know in our society that the only rapes that are taken seriously are those committed 
by strangers and are significantly violent”). 
 32 See Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault Cas-
es: Future Directions for Research and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145, 155 (2012) 
(documenting the attrition of rape allegations as cases progress through the criminal justice system); 
see also TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 25, at 33 (reporting that “among all women who were 
raped since age eighteen, only 7.8 percent said their rapist was criminally prosecuted, 3.3 percent said 
their rapist was convicted of a crime, and a mere 2.2 percent said their rapist was incarcerated”). 
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immigrants, LGBTQ individuals, women in poverty, and sex workers.33 More-
over, as compared to cases involving strangers, law enforcement tends to view 
non-stranger rape with greater skepticism.34 
With regard to both stranger and acquaintance rapes, police failure to in-
vestigate sexual assault cases is well documented.35 Consistent with the nation-
                                                                                                                           
 33 See generally ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD: SEXUAL ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
AND POLICING (Oct. 2015). The nationwide survey of more than 900 advocates, service providers, and 
attorneys confirmed “the entrenched nature of long-recognized, gender-driven biases by police against 
domestic violence or sexual assault claims.” Id. at 40. The survey also underscored the problem of 
police bias against “survivors of color, and against survivors who are poor, Native American, immi-
grant, or LGBTQ.” Id.; see also infra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (describing similar findings 
of the Detroit Sexual Assault Kit Action Research Project). An intersectional approach to equal pro-
tection requires accounting for the multitudinous ways that bias confronts victims. See Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242–44 (1991); see also CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, 
NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV.,  POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN 
LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY: A COLLABORATIVE STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE LOS AN-
GELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, AND THE LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 134–39 (2012) (explaining that sexual assault 
victims may experience a range of needs, including those related to immigration status, safe housing, 
job security, and financial stability). 
 34 See, e.g., SPOHN & TELLIS supra note 33, at 134–39 (analyzing rapes reported to the Los Ange-
les Police Department from 2005–2009 and finding that the existence of a relationship between the 
victim and the suspect influenced case processing); infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text; see 
also David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 317–18 (2000). As Bryden ex-
plains: 
Whatever their other disputes, rape-law scholars agree about several fundamental reali-
ties. They agree that, for practical purposes, forcible rape is really two crimes. The con-
sensus is that the criminal justice system performs at least reasonably well in dealing 
with “aggravated” rapes, defined as rapes by strangers, or men with weapons, or where 
the victim suffers ulterior injuries. With equal unanimity, scholars agree that the justice 
system often has performed poorly in cases involving rapes by unarmed acquaintances 
(dates, lovers, neighbors, co-workers, employers, and so on) and in which the victim 
suffers no additional injuries. Victims are less likely to report these acquaintance rapes 
(or even to recognize that they are rapes); if a victim does report it, the police are less 
likely to believe her; prosecutors are less likely to file charges; juries are less likely to 
convict; and any decision by an appellate court is more likely to be controversial. 
Id. 
 35 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 25, at 1230, 1233 (“[T]he unfounding rate for rape is 
roughly four times than for other major crimes.”). An ongoing three-year study funded by the National 
Institute of Justice is exploring the factors that influence the continuing attrition of rape cases. See 
Sandra Seitz, $1.2M Funds Study on Sexual Assault Case Processing, UMASS LOWELL (Mar. 29, 
2013), http://www.uml.edu/News/stories/2013/SexualAssaultGrant.aspx [https://perma.cc/GAP8-
4QFH]. According to the study: 
The researchers will establish partnerships with up to eight communities—urban, sub-
urban and rural—to explore the various and diverse elements that may be contributing 
to successful completion or attrition in sexual violence cases. They will study the case 
records from the first report through lodging of criminal charges, arrest, prosecution 
and sentencing. They will collect quantitative and qualitative data and interview those 
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wide data,36 close examination of particular jurisdictions,37 including Los An-
geles,38 Baltimore,39 St. Louis,40 New Orleans,41 New York,42 Salt Lake Coun-
ty,43 and Missoula, Montana,44 underscores that poor handling of rape cases by 
police is rampant.45 
A 2015 study of the policing of sexual assault in Detroit provides the lat-
est evidence of gender bias46 in case processing.47 In the most thorough exam-
                                                                                                                           
involved in the decision making, including patrol officers, detectives, prosecutors, vic-
tims and victim advocates. 
Id. 
 36 See Reporting Rates, RAINN, https://rainn.org/get-information/statistics/reporting-rates 
[https://perma.cc/252V-DYVL] (last visited Jan. 14, 2016) (estimating, based on recent FBI and DOJ 
figures, that out of every one thousand rapes, 344 are reported to the police; only sixty-three lead to an 
arrest); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 37 For a helpful overview, see generally Rape in the United States: The Chronic Failure to Report 
and Investigate Rape Cases: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime & 
Drugs, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Carol E. Tracy, Exec. Dir., Women’s Law Project), http://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09-14-10%20Tracy%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3H92-6TBC]. 
 38 See generally SPOHN & TELLIS, supra note 34 (detailing policing and prosecution of sexual 
assault in Los Angeles). 
 39 See Justin Fenton, City Rape Statistics, Investigations Draw Concern, BALT. SUN (June 27, 2010), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-06-27/news/bs-md-ci-rapes-20100519_1_rosalyn-branson-police-
detective-police-figures [https://perma.cc/5LPN-XT4A] (reporting that, from 2003–2010, police de-
tectives investigated only four of ten emergency rape calls). 
 40 See Jeremy Kohler, What Rape?: Abused by the System, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 28, 
2005, at A1 (reporting on the police practice of diverting rape complaints from formal processing 
channels). 
 41 See Laura Maggi, NOPD Downgrading of Rape Reports Raises Questions, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans) (July 11, 2009), http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/07/nopd_downgrading_
of_rape_repor.html [https://perma.cc/DRU8-UQ3A] (reporting that a majority of reported rapes were 
classified as noncriminal). 
 42 See John Eligon, Panel Seeks More Police Training on Sex Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/nyregion/03rape.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
WLK7-9PTZ] (reporting that the number of forcible rape complaints deemed unfounded had dramati-
cally increased and that the category of sex crimes classified as misdemeanors had grown by six per-
cent). 
 43 See Erin Alberty & Janelle Stecklein, Study: Most Cases in Salt Lake County Never Prosecut-
ed, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/57323282-
78/cases-rape-police-victim.html.csp [https://perma.cc/Z2RH-D5JT] (reporting on an audit of 270 
rape cases in Salt Lake County showing that 6% were prosecuted). 
 44 See infra notes 208–266 and accompanying text. 
 45 See Todd Lighty et al., Few Arrests, Convictions in Campus Sex Assault Cases, CHI. TRIB. 
(June 16, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-16/news/ct-met-campus-sexual-assaults-
0617-20110616_1_convictions-arrests-assault-cases [https://perma.cc/C827-D753]. Regarding cam-
pus sexual assault allegations in particular, one study of six Midwestern campuses found that 171 
reports to police resulted in only twelve arrests. See id. 
 46 See Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 3. 
Gender bias in policing practices is a form of discrimination that may result in [law en-
forcement agencies] providing less protection to certain victims on the basis of gender, 
failing to respond to crimes that disproportionately harm people of a particular gender 
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ination of untested (or “shelved”) rape kits to date,48 researchers discovered 
that cases involving non-strangers, in which suspect identity was not an issue, 
were typically not considered worthy of investigation.49 Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, police officers repeatedly indicated that the failure to submit a 
                                                                                                                           
or offering reduced or less robust services due to a reliance on gender stereotypes. Gen-
der bias, whether explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, may include police of-
ficers misclassifying or underreporting sexual assault or domestic violence cases, or in 
appropriately concluding that sexual assault cases are unfounded; failing to test sexual 
assault kits; interrogating rather than interviewing victims and witnesses . . . . 
Id. (alteration in original). According to a recent summary of the relevant social science, “[o]fficers 
tend to overestimate the percentage of false reports . . . , reflecting the myth that rape is rare.” Karen 
Rich & Patrick Seffrin, Police Interviews of Sexual Assault Reporters: Do Attitudes Matter?, 27 VIO-
LENCE & VICTIMS 263, 265 (2012). Researchers have documented a relationship between unfounding 
decisions and negative beliefs about victims. Id. 
 47 See generally REBECCA CAMPBELL ET AL., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., THE 
DETROIT SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT (SAK) ACTION RESEARCH PROJECT (ARP), FINAL REPORT (2015) 
(detailing findings of study of Detroit’s policing of sexual assault). The Detroit Study, which was 
funded by the National Institute of Justice, provides the most comprehensive examination of why 
police officers fail to test rape kits. The practices described clearly extend far beyond Detroit or any 
particular jurisdiction. In fact, the evidence is mounting that untested rape kits are a national problem: 
last summer, the “most detailed nationwide inventory of untested rape kits . . . found at least 70,000 
neglected kits in an open-records campaign covering 1,000-plus police agencies–and counting.” See 
Steve Reilly, Tens of Thousands of Rape Kits Go Untested Across USA, USA TODAY (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/16/untested-rape-kits-evidence-across-usa/29902199/ 
[https://perma.cc/24CR-WUUG]. As the report noted, “Despite its scope, the agency-by-agency count 
covers a fraction of the nation’s 18,000 police departments, suggesting the number of untested rape 
kits reaches into the hundreds of thousands.” Id. 
 48 Researchers counted over 11,000 sexual assault kits in police custody, of which 1600 were 
randomly selected for further study. CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 47, at iii, v; see also Carrie Bet-
tinger-Lopez, The Sexual Assault Kit Initiative: An Important Step Toward Ending the Rape Kit Back-
log (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/03/15/sexual-assault-kit-initiative-
important-step-toward-ending-rape-kit-backlog [https://perma.cc/58PY-JWTS] (describing the Obama 
Administration’s response to the problem of untested rape kits); CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 47, at 
3–7 (summarizing evidence that untested rape kits are a national problem). 
 49 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 47, at 121. 
[T]he attitudes and beliefs among crime lab personnel were similar to those of the po-
lice in that victims suspected of prostitution, adolescent victims, and victims of non-
stranger rape were not deemed credible and/or worthy of investigational and testing re-
sources. Of course, we cannot disentangle whether the attitudes expressed by crime lab 
personnel were due to messages they had received from the police over the years (either 
at an individual level or at the institutional level, given that they were part of same or-
ganization), or whether these were, more or less, their own beliefs about victims. At the 
very least, both crime lab personnel and police confirmed that they regularly discussed 
how some victims, some cases were not worthy of the investment of testing. 
Id. A major finding of the study was that, among those kits submitted for testing, there was no statisti-
cally significant difference in “hit” rates for stranger and non-stranger sexual assaults. Id. at 172 (“If 
the DNA from a SAK [sexual assault kit] matches to other sexual assault offenses . . . the hit reveals a 
pattern of serial sexual offending . . . .”) (alteration in original). Based on the “hit rate” equivalency, 
researchers concluded, “[T]hese data do not support prioritization of testing on the basis of victim-
offender relationship . . . .” Id. at 228. 
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rape kit for testing was reflective of a decision not to pursue the case, rather 
than a decision to pursue it without additional corroboration.50 Put differently, 
the kits were shelved because the allegations had already been disregarded, not 
because the case was perceived as sufficiently strong that the cost of testing 
was unjustified.51 Researchers explained: 
In many respects, the untested kits were a tangible sign about the 
dispositions of these cases— the case had been shelved, figuratively; 
the kit had been shelved, literally. . . . [A]s one police official put it: 
“The kits [that weren’t] tested were cases that we couldn’t or 
wouldn’t do anything about.”52  
The notion that the police “wouldn’t do anything” about certain cases was 
confirmed by data suggesting the operation of “negative beliefs and stereo-
types about victims, which adversely affected the quality of the investiga-
tion.”53 One frequent practice was “to disbelieve victims who knew their as-
sailants: police doubted victims’ credibility if they knew or were even mini-
mally acquainted with the assailant.”54 Asked “how common it was that known 
associates, friends, and/or partners rape their partners, police acknowledged 
that it does happen, but, in their belief, not that often.”55 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See id. at 104–05; Kathy Dobie, To Catch A Rapist, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 5, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/magazine/to-catch-a-rapist.html [https://perma.cc/GJ98-3FUL] 
(“[A]cquaintance-rape cases with DNA evidence do better in court—not only are these cases more 
likely to be pursued by prosecutors, but they’re also more likely to end in a successful conviction.”). 
 51 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 47, at 137 (noting that “many police heard these messages as: 
SAK [sexual assault kit] testing is extra work and it probably won’t matter anyway, and I don’t have 
time to do this, and I don’t believe the victim and no else does either, so why invest in this case”) 
(alteration in original). For a description of the kinds of evidence contained in a rape kit, see generally 
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Medical Forensic Sexual Assault Examinations: What Are They, and What Can 
They Tell the Courts?, 54 JUDGES’ J. 16 (2015). 
 52 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 47, at 105. 
 53 Id. at 109 (describing police attitudes as “rooted in sexism, racism, and classism”); see also id. 
at 101 (reporting one interviewee’s assessment that “this is a crime that affects women, and in this 
city, that means Black women, poor Black women . . . there’s a good chunk of the explanation [for the 
failure to submit the kits] right there”) (alteration in original). 
 54 Id. at 115. Other specific attitudes that “appear to have negatively impacted case investigations 
(and ultimately [sexual assault kit] submissions)” were that victims were engaged in prostitution/sex 
work, and that adolescent victims were claiming rape to “cover up for ‘bad’ behavior.” Id. at 109–13 
(alteration in original). In order to analyze the influence of police attitudes toward sexual assault on 
case processing, the study utilized investigator reports “to illustrate how these beliefs appear to be 
enacted in practice.” Id. at 118. Although “acknowledg[ing] that police reports do not tell the full 
story of an investigation,” researchers underscored that “what was expressed, clearly and frequently, 
in the reports we reviewed was a wide-spread disbelief of victims, particularly those who might have 
been involved in sex work, those who were adolescents, and those who knew their offenders.” Id. 
(alteration in original). 
 55 Id. at 115 (“When asked about how common it was that known associates, friends, and/or part-
ners rape their partners, police acknowledged that it does happen, but, in their belief, not that often: 
‘Truly rape? Sometimes. But not most of the time.’”). 
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Shelved rape kits in Detroit and elsewhere across the nation56 are tangible 
representation of a massive policing failure—a failure that is multi-faceted. 
Consider the enormous gap between commonplace practices and best practic-
es.57 A thorough sexual assault investigation requires fairly evaluating com-
plainant credibility,58 collecting and preserving all relevant and corroborative 
evidence,59 identifying and documenting injuries (physical and psychologi-
cal),60 and interviewing the complainant,61 in addition to all possible witness-
es62 and suspects.63 Unless and until police conduct a competent investigation, 
the case should not be closed.64 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See id. at v. 
 57 See Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 10–22. These “best practices” have 
recently been described and recommended by the Justice Department. See infra notes 270–283 and 
accompanying text (discussing the practical and conceptual significance of Justice Department guid-
ance in this area). 
 58 See Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 11. 
A victim’s nonconformance with behavior stereotypes should not impact the way law 
enforcement officers evaluate the complaint. Biases should also not prevent officers 
from taking a report or detectives from conducting a full investigation of all complaints 
received. Thus, the following factors, standing alone, are not dispositive in determining 
a victim’s credibility: delayed reporting; the victim’s history of making similar reports; 
the victim’s sexual history; the victim’s emotional state (e.g., whether a victim appears 
calm versus emotional or visibly upset); the victim’s lack of resistance; the victim’s 
criminal history or history of prostitution; evidence that the victim has a mental illness; 
evidence that the victim has a history of abusing alcohol or drugs; what the victim was 
wearing at the time the victimization occurred; whether the victim is of comparable 
size/strength to the assailant; the lack of any obvious signs of physical harm to the vic-
tim; the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity; and whether the victim was at-
tacked by a person of the same sex. 
Id. 
 59 Id. at 16. The guidance specifically mentions the importance of “ensuring that forensic medical 
exams, including ‘rape kits,’ are completed and analyzed in a timely manner . . . .” Id. 
 60 Id. This includes injuries observed at the time of the incident and during subsequent interac-
tions. Id. 
 61 See Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 12. 
Although law enforcement agencies will often need to ask difficult questions on the 
above topics to get information necessary to fully investigate a complaint or prepare a 
case for successful prosecution, how and when difficult questions are asked is an im-
portant consideration. By taking affirmative steps to respect the dignity of all complain-
ants, law enforcement officers may be able to increase the quality and quantity of the 
information they receive. In addition, there are also some questions that are inappropri-
ate to ask at any point during the investigation, no matter how they are phrased. These 
types of questions ignore the trauma that victims experience and, whether intentionally 
or not, suggest that blame should be placed on the victim or that the victim should not 
have reported the incident to the police at all. 
Id. 
 62 Id. at 16. Each interview should be conducted separately. Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See id. at 17. 
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In reality, police officers routinely opt not to thoroughly investigate, much 
less arrest, in sexual assault cases. Victims thus confront a law enforcement 
regime systemically predisposed to dismiss, rather than pursue, their com-
plaints.65 As a consequence, rape survivors are effectively denied the protec-
tive resources of the state. 
I turn now to the constitutional dimensions of this unequal police protec-
tion. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PROTECTION 
The meaning of equal protection has constricted since it was originally 
conceived. Although the 39th Congress chiefly intended the clause to protect 
those most vulnerable to police inaction, the Supreme Court’s subsequent in-
terpretations have substantially foreclosed the possibility of legal redress for 
discriminatory underenforcement. Section A explains the 39th Congress’s con-
cern that all citizens be protected from private violence.66 Section B explains 
how the Supreme Court has obscured the clause’s core purpose.67 
A. Protection as Paramount: The 39th Congress 
As the 39th Congress debated the Fourteenth Amendment, a particular 
concern loomed large.68 Although slavery had been formally abolished, white 
violence against blacks remained rampant and unpunished.69 Without federal 
intervention,70 this denial of protection was bound to perpetuate the subservi-
                                                                                                                           
All sexual assault or domestic violence complaints should be investigated, regardless of 
any of the following circumstances: the victim has gaps in memory; there are potential 
conflicts in the victim’s statements; the victim is reluctant to share his or her story; the 
victim expresses concern over having the alleged assailant charged with a crime; the 
victim expresses self-blame (e.g., suggests that she/he didn’t fight hard enough to sop 
the assault); the victim is emotionally distraught and unable to discuss the incident; or 
the victim was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the incident. 
See Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 17. A police investigation should “ascertain the 
facts, determine whether the incident is a crime, and [if so] develop a case that supports effective 
prosecution and holds the perpetrator accountable.” Id. at 3. (alteration in original). 
 65 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (citing the Justice Department’s description of the 
effects of gender bias in sexual assault investigations). 
 66 See infra notes 68–93 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 94–118 and accompanying text. 
 68 See JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 116–31 (1965). 
 69 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 
119–23 (Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2014) (1988). 
 70 See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986). The Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, declared that “citizens, of every race and color, without 
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right . . . 
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is en-
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ent legal status of black citizens.71 The promise of equality could not possibly 
be achieved unless the laws against private violence were applied regardless of 
the race of its victims.72 
With this imperative in mind, the framers included a provision squarely 
aimed at the state’s failure to protect.73 In order to ensure that the laws against 
violence would be uniformly enforced, the Equal Protection Clause was em-
bedded in the Fourteenth Amendment.74 
This history is not generally contested.75 Indeed, among scholars whose 
work reflects a range of methodological approaches to constitutional interpre-
tation,76 there is widespread agreement about the relevant history: the central 
concern of the Equal Protection Clause was protection from violence—that is, 
a need for criminal law enforcement.77 Consider a non-exhaustive sample of 
                                                                                                                           
joyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1866) (amended 1991). The Act, moreover, granted 
the federal courts jurisdiction to “dispense the protection that was being denied.” See Robert J. Ka-
czorowski, Congress’s Power to Enact Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Reme-
dies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 258 (2005). As Robert Kaczorowski explains, 
“[T]he framers devised a truly extraordinary remedy for violations of civil rights caused by state ac-
tion or inaction: they conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to the exclusion of the states, to ad-
minister civil and criminal justice in actions arising under state law.” Id. at 282. The Supreme Court, 
however, quickly curtailed this jurisdictional grant. For a thorough account, see generally Robert D. 
Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1989). 
 71 See TENBROEK, supra note 68, at 116–31; see also Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 126–34 (1991) (developing the idea 
of equal protection as a guarantor of “sole sovereignty”). 
 72 It should be emphasized that the framers were concerned with protection “not only from private 
violence, but also from the economic isolation, deprivation, dependence, and ultimate economic sub-
jugation that would inevitably result from the withdrawal of the state’s private law.” West, supra note 
71, at 144. The modern day implications of this concern are profoundly important and worthy of fur-
ther exploration. 
 73 See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L. J. 1385, 
1436–38, 1447–51 (1992); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 74 See infra notes 75–83 and accompanying text. 
 75 See West, supra note 71, at 132. West writes: 
As far as I can tell, this particular history is not controversial; indeed, this can fairly be 
called the uncontested meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the degree of dis-
cord among legal theorists regarding the meaning of the equal protection clause, it is, at 
first blush, somewhat remarkable that there is such widespread consensus among histo-
rians, including those same legal theorists when wearing their “historian” hats, that this 
abolitionist meaning, or something closely akin to it, is the meaning of the equal protec-
tion clause which was embraced by those who most actively campaigned for its inclu-
sion in the Constitution, from the 1830’s all the way through the passage of the 
Amendment itself. 
Id. 
 76 For a sociology of the constitutional law that emerged during Reconstruction, see generally 
PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 47–55 (1999). 
 77 This is not to suggest that the paradigmatic equal protection violation was the only kind of 
violation contemplated by the framers. Many of the constitutional claims subsequently placed within 
the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause may have been conceived originally as violations of either 
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this scholarly consensus.78 Akhil Amar explains that equal protection “at its 
core affirms the rights of victims to be equally protected by government from 
criminals.”79 Randy Barnett notes that the Clause “mandates that protection of 
proper laws be provided equally to all persons.”80 Cass Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule observe that “[t]he very idea of ‘equal protection of the laws,’ in its 
oldest and most literal sense, attests to the importance of enforcing the criminal 
and civil law so as to safeguard the potential victims of private violence.”81 
William Stuntz writes: 
In criminal justice as elsewhere, discretion and discrimination travel 
together. Hence the need to ensure that the government offers the 
“protection of the laws”—a great constitutional phrase, often lost in 
the shadow cast by the modifier “equal”—to all its citizens. That 
need was especially salient to the men who wrote and ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Discrimination and lawlessness dominated 
post-Civil War Southern justice, as private vigilantes enforced vi-
cious racist codes and government officials refused to stop them. Of-
fering the law’s protection to ex-slaves was one of the chief goals of 
the Amendment’s drafters.82 
As Robin West emphasizes, “[T]he state’s protection against private violence is 
the central, minimal guarantee of the equal protection clause.”83 
One need not be an originalist84 to care about the origins of equal protec-
tion.85 I certainly do not claim that a historical understanding of the concept 
                                                                                                                           
the Due Process Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See infra note 104 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the implications of a counterfactual Slaughter-House ruling). 
 78 For a collection of the sources cited in infra notes 79–83 and others like them, see Christopher 
R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 1, 5–10 (2008). Green also defends a “duty-to-protect” meaning of the 
Clause. See id. at 14. 
 79 Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 102 
(2000). 
 80 Randy E. Barnett, Foreward: What’s So Wicked About Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
325, 331 (2005). 
 81 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omis-
sions, and the Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 708 (2005). 
 82 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 821 
(2006). 
 83 West, supra note 71, at 141. 
 84 See Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion & the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1917, 1921 (2012). 
Originalism is fundamentally about a narrative of rhetorical self-identification with the 
achievements of a founding historical moment. That is the real basis of its power. An 
originalist argument will succeed to the extent that it can persuade its audience that it 
can keep faith with that identification. Originalist argument is a kind of constitutional 
rhetoric, connecting us with the past, constructing a narrative of national identity. 
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must dictate its contemporary meaning. Indeed, the 39th Congress was not in-
terested in prohibiting sex discrimination.86 Nonetheless, the framers’ vision of 
what the Clause essentially required—referred to in this discussion as the “pro-
tection model”87—matters for several reasons. 
As I will demonstrate, the protection model represents a concrete alterna-
tive to the Supreme Court’s quite divergent rendition of what equal protection 
requires,88 placing existing jurisprudential limitations in stark relief.89 This is 
                                                                                                                           
Id. 
 85 See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doc-
trine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1066–67.  Barnes and Chemerinsky explain their interpretative stance: 
[W]e are not suggesting that the only way to understand present-day Equal Protection 
Doctrine is as a function of the legislative impetus and societal conditions that gave rise 
to the Fourteenth Amendment and its companion Reconstruction Amendments. Inquir-
ing into structure and history, as well as the intent of the drafters, are but a few of the 
several tools useful for interpreting the Constitution. . . . [R]ather than espousing the 
competing virtues of particular ideological commitments to interpretation, our point is 
merely to suggest that in divining the contemporary meaning of equality, it is helpful in 
part to look to the structure, historical, and textual contours of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. 
Id.; see also infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 86 For competing accounts of the constitutional significance of this fact, see generally Steven G. 
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011); Reva R. 
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002). 
 87 The approach has been variously described. 
 88 See infra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
 89 This observation is consistent with Robin West’s defense of a constitutional methodology that 
contemplates the relevance of history: 
[T]he history and text being shed, although no doubt in large part a succession of waves 
of brutality and oppression, may also contain moments of real nobility and courage, and 
the text that is the culmination of those moments may embody and express part of a 
profoundly moral social vision. If we turn our backs on history and text, in short, we 
may be turning our backs on imaginings more worthy than our own. The Fourteenth 
Amendment, in fact, may be just such a text; its passage may have been just such a 
moment, and its normative implications just such a vision. If we abandon the history 
and text of the Fourteenth Amendment as possible guides to at least its possible mean-
ings, whether or not those meanings exhaust the possibilities and whether or not we 
should regard them as “authoritative,” we may be abandoning a source of moral insight 
and a vision of the just society that is superior to those visions our current ahistoric and 
parochial “selves” have managed to envision. . . . Even if we assume, or insist, that the 
intended meaning should not be regarded as the only possible meaning—that there may 
have been several and conflicting intended meanings, and that the historical meaning 
carries no modern legal mandate—the possibility that the originally intended meaning 
is normatively superior to modern interpretations is surely a sufficient reason to reac-
quaint oneself with the text and origins of the constitutional text. 
West, supra note 71, at 123–24. 
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true generally but also with specific regard to failures to police gender vio-
lence.90 
Apart from the realm of doctrinal critique, the protection model highlights 
the importance of Congress’s “Reconstruction Power”91 in ensuring a remedy 
for unchecked private violence.92 The protection model thus facilitates more 
expansive thinking about the federal obligation to dismantle regimes of dis-
criminatory underenforcement. This insight has special force in the policing 
realm. 
The framework that emerges from this discussion allows us to situate the 
under-policing of rape law in constitutional context. In Part III, I will describe 
recent moves by the Justice Department to hold law enforcement officers ac-
countable for failing to protect victims of sexual assault. In important respects, 
this turn is unprecedented.93 Yet insofar as the latest developments reflect an 
enduring concern for violence without redress, the (re)emergence of federal 
power should be understood to possess deep historical roots. 
B. Protection as Peripheral: The Supreme Court 
Soon after the Supreme Court began hearing cases involving the Equal 
Protection Clause, without fanfare, it displaced the protection model with the 
familiar anti-classification approach that today remains the animating feature 
of equal protection jurisprudence.94 According to the Court, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is essentially meant to prohibit legislative and administrative dis-
tinctions that rest on an improper basis.95 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See infra notes 107–108 and accompanying text. 
 91 Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (2010). 
 92 See infra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 94 See Green, supra note 78, at 278, 290–91. Early cases from the 1870s were more consistent 
with a “duty-to-protect reading.” Id. By the mid-1880s, however, class-discriminating legislation had 
become the focus. Id. at 288–91 (tracing the jurisprudential evolution). In 1886, the U.S. Supreme 
Court explained its understanding in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, “[T]he equal protection of the laws is a 
pledge of the protection of equal laws.” 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). A decade later, the anti-
classification principle was more fully articulated: 
[T]he mere fact of classification is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of 
the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that in all cases it must appear 
not only that a classification has been made, but also that it is one based upon some rea-
sonable ground—some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempt-
ed classification . . . . 
Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165 (1897). 
 95 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification 
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2003) (discussing the interplay between anti-
subordination norms and the anti-classification approach). Although anti-classification has, over time, 
described the Court’s dominant mode of understanding the meaning of equal protection, “American 
civil rights jurisprudence vindicates both anticlassification and antisubordination commitments, even 
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In the course of elaborating on this principle, the Court has crafted a set 
of doctrinal parameters that have further directed equal protection away from 
protection.96 Both the state action requirement, which tends to eliminate inac-
tion as a concern,97 and the tiered levels of scrutiny that vary depending on 
group composition98 may be viewed as by-products of the Court’s move to an 
anti-classification regime. 
The turn away from a protection model also facilitated the creation of a 
discriminatory intent requirement. In a line of cases beginning in 1976 with 
Washington v. Davis,99 continuing to 1977 with Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 100 and culminating in 1979 with 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,101 the U.S. Supreme 
Court announced its insistence on a showing of “discriminatory purpose,”102 
which necessitated that “the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a partic-
                                                                                                                           
as the antisubordination principle sits in perpetual judgment of American civil rights law, condemning 
its formalism, compromises, and worldly limitations, and summoning it to more socially transforma-
tive ends.” Id. at 10–11. For a discussion of how the protection model (referred to as the “abolitionist 
understanding”) differs from anti-subordination and anti-classification approaches, see West, supra 
note 71, at 134–38 (arguing that formalist and anti-subordinationist models both reflect (conflicting) 
interpretations of equality, rather than elaborating on the meaning of equal protection). 
 96 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 189 (1989). To grasp the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court 
has refashioned the Equal Protection Clause, we might observe that its two seminal cases of police 
failures to protect victims from private violence were not even framed as equal protection claims. See 
Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189. In 1989, in DeShaney v. Winneba-
go County Department of Social Services, the Court addressed (and limited the reach of) substantive 
due process. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189. In 2005, in Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzalez, 
the Court addressed (and contracted the scope of) procedural due process. See Town of Castle Rock, 
545 U.S. at 768. Neither case, according to the Court, involved a constitutional duty to protect. See 
id.; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189. 
 97 For historical analysis, see generally Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? 
Reconsidering the “State Action” Cases of the Waite Court, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343 (2007). For 
one of many jurisprudential critiques, see generally Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: 
Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil Rights Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2006). For 
a more recent assessment in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 2015 in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, see generally James M. Oleske, “State Inaction,” Equal Protection, and Religious 
Resistance to LGBT Rights, 87 COLO. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 98 Kermit Roosevelt III, What If Slaughter-House Had Been Decided Differently?, 45 IND. L. 
REV. 61, 73 (2011). As Kermit Roosevelt has written: 
[E]xceptions must be made to the anti-classificationist command. Sometimes discrimi-
nation (by which I mean merely differential treatment) is morally required . . . . And 
sometimes it is in keeping with our idea of merit and desert . . . . Rational basis review 
in the absence of a suspect classification, and the related rule that disparate impact by 
itself merits only rational basis review, limit judicial interference. 
Id. 
 99 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976). 
 100 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977). 
 101 Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). 
 102 Id. at 279. 
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ular course of action at least in part ‘because of’ not merely ‘in spite of’ its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group.”103 
One striking feature of the intent requirement is how it derives from the 
anti-classification approach to equal protection. Kermit Roosevelt explains the 
logic as follows: 
Under our current anti-classificationist approach . . . [w]ithout inten-
tional discrimination, there can be no anti-classification claim. That 
makes some sense as far as anti-classification is concerned. . . . Gov-
ernmental sorting of individuals into racial categories—regardless of 
whether this sorting is the basis for oppression, or even for differential 
treatment of the categories—is itself the harm the clause seeks to 
avert. Unintentional discrimination does not involve any such classifi-
cation and, therefore, it is reasonable that unintentional discrimination 
cannot create a claim under anti-classificationist equal protection. But 
from the failure to protect perspective, the harm more likely lies in the 
actual injury suffered, which the state has failed to avert or remedy. 
Intent is far less relevant. Put another way, failure to protect seems to 
demand equality of outcome in a way that anti-classification does 
not.104 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Id. To evaluate whether a law enforcement activity was motivated by discriminatory intent, 
courts are instructed to consider the totality of circumstances and are to consider factors that indirectly 
indicate an intent to discriminate, including evidence of discriminatory impact, evidence of departures 
from proper procedures, and contemporaneous statements by a decisionmaker or by responding offic-
ers. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66. Notwithstanding this directive, courts are 
generally skeptical of the use of discriminatory impact to establish discriminatory intent. See, e.g., 
Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 104 Roosevelt, supra note 98, at 75–76. Roosevelt’s larger point is that the Court’s decision in the 
Slaughter-House Cases to exclude Bill of Rights liberties from the protections of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause may have resulted in an undue narrowing of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. As 
Roosevelt puts it, “By forcing Equal Protection and Due Process to shoulder a burden that Privileges 
or Immunities let slip, Slaughter-House prevented them from performing other functions.” Id. at 70. 
What is especially intriguing about this idea is that, had Equal Protection not been tasked with this 
burden, it may well have evolved to fulfill its intended function. In this counterfactual, 
Equal protection would be understood to be focused on the failure of state officials to 
enforce state law to the benefit of certain individuals or groups. Such selective en-
forcement would be the core Equal Protection violation, rather than the somewhat mar-
ginal one it is today. We would understand Equal Protection as a positive right, as guar-
anteeing some affirmative assistance and protection from the state. . . . And we would 
have a greater receptivity to the idea that failure to protect is constitutionally problemat-
ic. 
Id. at 72–73. Doctrinally, were these claims to be considered paradigmatic, disparate impact would 
trigger more aggressive judicial scrutiny. Id. at 77. In a similar vein, a differently decided Slaughter-
House may well have resulted in a subordination-oriented Due Process Clause—one that would re-
quire “more searching judicial review . . . where government action burdens a subset of a vulnerable 
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The Court’s inattention to equality of outcome—disparate impact—has 
translated into an intent requirement that does not map well onto the workings 
of bias.105 This is a significant problem in the policing context, which the 
Court has utterly failed to connect with animating equal protection concerns.106 
Even in cases alleging paradigmatic failure to protect violations, the Court’s 
demand for a showing of intentional discrimination has often proved to be an 
insurmountable barrier.107 For instance, despite pervasive gender bias in law 
enforcement’s response to violence over time, women’s underenforcement re-
lated claims have fared poorly. By requiring proof of intentional discrimina-
tion, the Court has largely immunized the underenforcement of laws against 
private violence108—a problem that the Equal Protection Clause was specifi-
cally designed to redress.109 
                                                                                                                           
group.” Id. at 86. See generally Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (holding that the 
Bill of Rights liberties are excluded from the protections of the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
 105 See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that racial discrimination is substantially 
motivated by unconscious bias); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 
100 YALE L. J. 1281, 1321 n.170 (1991) (noting that intent “requires perpetrators to know what they 
are doing and why” and that “[m]ost discrimination does not happen this way”); Reva Siegel, Why 
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1138 (1997) (stating that discriminatory purpose “is a juridical concept that does 
not reflect prevailing understandings of the ways in which racial or gender bias operates”). For a col-
lection of work focused on the problem of implicit bias, see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 978 n.45 (2006). See also Jody Armour, Stereotypes and 
Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 750–59 
(1995) (reviewing the relevant social-psychological literature). 
 106 See Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189. 
 107 See, e.g., Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1066 (1st Cir. 1997); Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 780–82; 
Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 876 (2d Cir. 1994); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409, 415–
16 (5th Cir. 1989); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694–97 (10th Cir. 1988); Soto v. 
Carrasquillo, 878 F. Supp. 324, 329–30 (D.P.R. 1995); Cellini v. City of Sterling Heights, 856 F. 
Supp. 1215, 1220 (E.D. Mich. 1994). For a notable exception to the rule of no liability, see Thurman 
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521,1527–29 (D. Conn. 1984); see also Balistreri v. Pacifica 
Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 700–01 (9th Cir. 1988). It is worth noting, as compared to the domestic 
violence arena, that police failures to protect sexual assault victims have generated far less constitu-
tional litigation. This landscape, however, may be on the cusp of change. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, 
Marlowe v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 4:16-cv-00076-KAW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2016) (on 
file with author) (alleging that police officers violated plaintiff’s rights to equal protection and due 
process by engaging in a policy of failing to diligently investigate sexual assault allegations). 
 108 See, e.g., Soto, 103 F.3d at 1066; Soto, 878 F. Supp. at 329–30. Gender-based “failure to pro-
tect” litigation has mostly involved domestic violence and rarely prevailed. See Niji Jain, Comment, 
Engendering Fairness in Domestic Violence Arrests: Improving Police Accountability Through the 
Equal Protection Clause, 60 EMORY L. J. 1011, 1011 (2011). Niji Jain noted: 
[T]he Supreme Court has substantially limited the possible § 1983-based causes of ac-
tion a victim of gender-based violence can bring against a police officer. The only re-
maining avenue for liability is an equal protection claim. However, equal protection 
challenges have met such consistent rejection in the lower federal courts that many 
scholars believe they are not a tenable strategy for police accountability. 
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This disconnect may result, at least in part, from the dictates of institu-
tional competence. As Robin West suggested decades ago in an influential dis-
cussion of marital rape,110 “Jurisprudential reasons may draw the Court to a 
rationality model of equal protection analysis.”111 The dominant, anti-
classification approach to equal protection—the “rationality model”—is attrac-
tive precisely because it corresponds to how judges decide cases. West ex-
plained: 
The rationality model requires state legislators and lawmakers to 
“treat like groups alike” and requires Courts to see that they do so. 
Any legislative classification, then, must be based upon a difference 
between the groups that is relevant to a legitimate state interest. . . . 
[T]he model has an important virtue from a judicial perspective: it 
limits the Court’s role to the familiar one of ensuring legal justice. 
To do justice, a Court must treat like cases alike. For the most part, 
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, simply police against 
lower court infractions of this principle. The rationality model simp-
ly imposes an equivalent duty on legislators. Thus, while judges 
must treat like cases alike, legislators, who deal with groups instead 
of cases, also must treat like groups alike. The Court’s duty under 
the equal protection clause, then, is to ensure that the legislature 
metes out equal justice to the groups before it, just as the Court’s 
appellate function is to ensure that lower courts mete out equal jus-
tice to the individuals who appear before them. The rationality mod-
el of equal protection may be the only model that so neatly dovetails 
with the most traditional, and even classical, view of judicial func-
tions and domain.112 
                                                                                                                           
Id. 
 109 See supra notes 68–83 and accompanying text. 
 110 See generally Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990) (positioning the marital rape exemption as a violation of equal 
protection). West’s conception of equal protection, as well as her proposed Married Women’s Privacy 
Act, inspired Victoria Nourse, then a staffer on the Judiciary Committee, to pursue the idea for legisla-
tion that would eventually become the VAWA. FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERI-
CAN LAW 328–37 (2009). West’s theory of the source of equal protection formalism has yet to receive 
the scholarly attention it deserves. 
 111 West, supra note 110, at 73. 
 112 Id. at 73–74. To underscore the intractability of the dynamics involved, the passage continues: 
By construing the equal protection clause as a source of “law” to be applied by Courts, 
the general legal culture may have to a considerable degree determined its meaning, not 
only because we have rendered it subject to the Court’s own sense of the pragmatic lim-
its of its powers, but also because of the nature of law. As long as courts interpret and 
enforce the equal protection clause, it should not be surprising that they interpret the 
clause as requiring “legal justice,” or like groups must be treated alike, rather than dis-
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On this view, given the Court’s institutional orientation and expertise, it 
was (and it remains) unlikely to adopt a more protection-based interpretation 
of equal protection. Under a pluralistic conception of constitutional meaning, it 
would fall to Congress and the executive branch to ensure that the state is 
providing the requisite protection from private violence.113 
Those critical of a “juricentric approach to enforcing the Equal Protection 
Clause”114 stress the potential for Congress to advance a more ambitious civil 
rights agenda.115 This vision, however, is necessarily tempered by the Court’s 
                                                                                                                           
tributive or even compensatory justice. There is no reason to think that the Supreme 
Court is not fully confident of its ability to oversee the quality of formal, legal justice 
dispensed by lower courts: that is the Court’s traditional, appellate function. The ration-
ality model of the fourteenth amendment extends the obligation of doing legal justice to 
legislators, but it makes absolutely no fundamental change in the Court’s social role. In 
this area as in any other, the Court continues to oversee the quality of legal justice met-
ed out by other institutional and governmental bodies. Consequently, the ultimate judi-
cial embrace of the rationality model, including the formal understanding of the re-
quirement of legal justice, the antidiscrimination principle, the intent requirement, the 
two-tiered or three-tiered levels of review, and the “real differences” rule in the gender 
cases, may have been inevitable, regardless of the political composition of the Court. 
The Court simply may be unable and unwilling to sustain, for any length of time, any 
reading of equal protection that would be less legalistic and more substantive. 
Id. at 74. 
 113 Id. at 75. 
Under a pluralistic approach to constitutional meaning, the equal protection clause 
might require (1) that legislative classifications treat like groups alike; (2) that legisla-
tion not insulate or further the social subordination of women, blacks, or other suspect 
classes; and (3) that states ensure that all citizens enjoy the protection of its laws against 
private wrongdoing. . . . [If] we expand our conception of who and what is obligated to 
ensure equal protection under the fourteenth amendment, then pluralistic conceptions of 
equal protection meaning begin to look plausible. The Court could continue to ensure 
that legislation treat like groups alike. However, Congress could ensure that state laws 
prohibit subordination. Lastly, the executive branch and Congress jointly could ensure 
that the state supply the fundamental benefits and burdens of the social contract to all 
citizens equally. The state would provide security against private violence and wrong-
doing in exchange for abidance with the obligations of citizenry under a rule of law re-
gime.  
Id. (alteration in original). 
 114 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 525 (2001). Robert Post and Reva Siegel 
have persuasively argued that “the Court will sometimes require the assistance of Congress to succeed 
in the very task of constitutional interpretation” and that “Congress’s understanding of equality is a 
vital resource for the Court to consider as it interprets the Equal Protection Clause.” See id. at 519–20. 
Notwithstanding the ways in which Congress is uniquely situated to vindicate equal protection norms, 
the Court has at times “seem[ed] to reason from the premise that its own authority in enforcing the 
Equal Protection Clause renders Congress’s role in enforcing the Clause incidental and a ready target 
of judicial discipline.” Id. at 522. (alteration in original). 
 115 See Balkin, supra note 91, at 1846–56 (discussing how Congress could enforce the equal pro-
tection guarantee while transcending the limits imposed by the Court’s faulty constructions). See gen-
erally DAVID H. GANS & DOUGLAS T. KENDALL, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., THE SHIELD OF 
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hostility to legislative enforcement mechanisms.116 Where the failure to police 
gender violence is concerned, commentators understandably speak of useful 
Congressional action in mostly aspirational terms.117 
This framing is perfectly understandable: after passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the protection model of equal protection, along with the federal 
power to enforce it, lay dormant. Recent events, however, have revived this 
model and this power, allowing a glimpse of a modern version of what the 39th 
Congress intended.118 As I will show, the Justice Department’s latest deploy-
ment of its “pattern or practice” enforcement authority—authority granted over 
two decades ago by statute—may come as close as any intervention since Re-
construction to addressing the framers’ chief concern with underenforcement. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s divergent path, the original meaning of equal pro-
tection has begun to resurface. 
                                                                                                                           
NATIONAL PROTECTION: THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(2009) (arguing that the Enforcement Clauses grant Congress the power to regulate private action). 
 116 See Balkin, supra note 91, at 1820 (noting that the Court has “systematically undermined 
Congress’s powers to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments”). In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Morrison, invalidated the civil rights provision of the VAWA, curtailing Congress’s 
authority to enforce equal protection. As Vicki Jackson explains: 
In United States v. Morrison . . . the Court treats the arguments for congressional power 
to enact the Violence Against Women Act’s civil rights remedy under the Commerce 
Clause as a matter separate and distinct from the question of congressional power under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The history of state officials’ failures to respond to vio-
lence directed at women because of their gender, and the effects of such unremedied vi-
olence on women’s abilities to participate in public life (including the economy), is ab-
sent from the Commerce Clause discussion. Although some amici had argued that 
whatever the limits of the commerce power, Congress surely had the authority to re-
move obstacles that stood in the way of full and equal participation in national econom-
ic life by a traditionally disadvantaged group, the suggestion that “equal protection” (or 
equality) concerns might inform analysis of the scope of the Commerce Clause was not 
even acknowledged by the Court. The Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause were like ships in different seas of argument, the one 
bearing no connection to the other and analyzed in isolation from each other. 
Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1276 (2001); see Post & Siegel, supra note 114, at 481–86. 
 117 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 91, at 1850 (suggesting that Congress consider “two basic models 
for remedying state neglect-—one focused on protecting rights and the other focused on protecting 
classes”). 
 118 See THOMAS E. PEREZ & MICHAEL W. COTTER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RE: THE UNITED 
STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE MISSOULA POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2013), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/22/missoulapdfind_5-15-13.pdf. I do not 
claim that this application reflects the closest possible resemblance to the originally intended regime. 
See Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enact Fourteenth Amendment Rights, supra note 70. Nor do I 
assume that existing enforcement mechanisms are superior to the possible alternatives. See Balkin, 
supra note 91, at 1850–56 (proposing various ways for Congress to ensure that states provide protec-
tion from violence). 
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III. THE NEW POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Section 14141, 42 U.S.C., authorizes the Justice Department to bring suit 
against police departments engaged in a “pattern or practice” of unconstitu-
tional conduct.119 The statute was enacted in 1994, after the videotaped police 
beating of Rodney King and its aftermath brought to the fore limitations of 
extant legal responses to police misconduct.120 Structural reform litigation, in 
particular, had been substantially foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s issuance 
of a series of standing decisions restricting plaintiffs’ rights to sue a police de-
partment for equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.121 
Since the enactment of § 14141, most Justice Department investigations 
have been resolved by a negotiated settlement,122 although a number of en-
                                                                                                                           
 119 The statute reads: 
§ 14141. Cause of action 
(a) Unlawful conduct 
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any per-
son acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of 
conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental 
agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration 
of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro-
tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
(b) Civil action by Attorney General 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of 
paragraph (1) has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United 
States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to elimi-
nate the pattern or practice. 
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012). 
 120 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 8–13 (2009); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Depart-
ments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1356–58 (2015) (providing a thorough account of the origins of 
§ 14141); see also Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 155 
(2015) (arguing that the Justice Department can increase the effectiveness of § 14141 by placing 
greater reliance on newly amassed federal datasets). 
 121 See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–10 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–
73 (1976); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493–99 (1974); Harmon, supra note 120, at 11–12. 
Rachel Harmon noted, 
As a result [of the Court’s decisions in this area], § 1983 is a weaker tool for seeking 
institutional reform in police departments than it has been in other civil rights contexts. 
Prior to § 14141, no statute other than § 1983 authorized suits for equitable relief 
against police departments for officer misconduct, and it remains the case that no other 
statute authorizes private equitable suits. 
Harmon, supra note 120, at 11–12 (alteration in original). 
 122 Harmon, supra note 120, at 16–17. As Harmon has explained: 
Consent decrees and memoranda of agreement are negotiated settlements in which a 
city does not admit liability, but nevertheless agrees to adopt specific remedial 
measures to end the matter and avoid litigation. Consent decrees are more formal and 
are contained in a court order. Thus, a district court must agree to terminate a consent 
decree. The memoranda, by contrast, are drafted as private contracts between the city at 
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forcement actions are currently pending in federal court.123 Unsurprisingly, the 
Justice Department’s enforcement capability has been constrained by resource 
limitations,124 and commentators have proposed various ways of improving the 
statute’s implementation.125  
For most of its history, the use of § 14141 was aimed at a specific type of 
constitutional violation—namely, misconduct falling within the ambit of dis-
criminatory over-policing.126 In a subtle and unremarked shift, however, 
§ 14141 investigations have lately grown to encompass patterns of biased un-
derenforcement. This development has special significance for groups afforded 
                                                                                                                           
issue and the United States. Parties can enforce them only by suing for breach of con-
tract. Both the Justice Department’s memoranda of agreement and consent decrees have 
provided for independent auditors to monitor and report on the police department’s 
compliance with the agreement. 
Id. 
 123 See generally Complaint, United States v. Colorado City, No. 3:12-cv-08123-HRH (D. Ariz. 
June 21, 2012) (detailing enforcement action against Colorado City, Arizona); Complaint, United 
States v. Maricopa County, No. 2:12-cv-00981-ROS (D. Ariz. May 10, 2012) (describing enforcement 
action against Maricopa County Police Department). The outcome of these cases will likely bear on 
the scope of future enforcement efforts. Cf. Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 120, at 
1417–18. Relatedly, Stephen Rushin has questioned whether “the DOJ [can] force reform on a munic-
ipality that adamantly opposes it?” Id. He concluded:  
This represents that most important question facing SRL [structural reform litigation] in 
the future. The answer will define the future usefulness of this regulatory mechanism. 
Thus far, the DOJ has not fully pursued SRL against municipalities that ardently oppose 
federal oversight. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 124 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 120, at 1415–16. As Rushin notes, 
Another potential drawback of § 14141 is that the federal government simply lacks the 
resources necessary for aggressive enforcement. Remember that the DOJ has only in-
vestigated around three police agencies each year pursuant to § 14141 . . . . As one for-
mer DOJ litigator complained, “I can tell you . . . that there are far more agencies that 
. . . have some sort of a problem of constitutional dimensions than we would ever get 
to.” 
Id.; see Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3244–47 
(2014) (documenting spotty Justice Department enforcement and pointing to causal shifts in enforce-
ment policies that are partly based on Administration priorities). 
 125 See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collabora-
tion in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 
515–19 (2008); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citi-
zens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1396–1407 (2000); Harmon, su-
pra note 120, at 20–23; Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police 
Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 479, 
536–42 (2009).  
 126 Writing in 2009, just before the onset of developments described in these pages, Rachel Har-
mon observed, “All of the Justice Department’s § 14141 investigations have focused on a few key 
kinds of misconduct, including racial profiling and other forms of discriminatory harassment, the use 
of excessive force, false arrests, and illegal stops and searches.” Harmon, supra note 120, at 18. 
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relatively scant access to criminal justice, including victims of gender vio-
lence. 
Section A discusses how § 14141 was first applied to the phenomenon of 
gender-biased underenforcement, examining four “pattern or practice” investi-
gations initially focused on overenforcement.127 Section B describes the 
groundbreaking investigation into the underenforcement of rape law in Mis-
soula, Montana.128 Section C details successful efforts to incentivize depart-
mental reform in the area of sexual assault.129 
A. § 14141 and the Exposure of Gender Bias 
Since 2009, the Justice Department has begun attending to systemic fail-
ures to police gender violence.130 In four cases that prominently featured famil-
iar problems of affirmative misconduct and overenforcement, gender-biased 
underenforcement materialized as a separate but much-related concern.131 This 
small set of § 14141 investigations can be viewed as precursors to the interven-
tion in Missoula, which was the first to exclusively target an inadequate re-
sponse to sexual violence and the first to find that a failed response to such 
violence was unconstitutional.132 This shift in the meaning of law enforcement 
accountability began with the four investigations that zeroed in on gender dis-
crimination. 
A close look at these cases enriches conventional understandings of how 
biased policing works on the ground. As the Justice Department discovered, 
bias may be leveled at more than one demographic group simultaneously;133 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See infra notes 130–207 and accompanying text. 
 128 See infra notes 208–266 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 267–283 and accompanying text. 
 130 See generally THOMAS E. PEREZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RE: UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE (2011); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS 
DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011) [hereinafter 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT]; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DIST. OF N.J., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT (2014). This coincides with a greater overall emphasis on civil rights 
enforcement. See Sarah Childress, How the DOJ Reforms a Police Department Like Ferguson, 
FRONTLINE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/how-the-doj-
reforms-a-police-department-like-ferguson/ [https://perma.cc/J99F-78LQ] (“The Obama administra-
tion has used its power aggressively to take on widespread problems of police brutality, discrimination 
and other abuse in local jurisdictions, negotiating more settlement agreements than either the Clinton 
or George W. Bush administrations.”). 
 131 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 208–266 and accompanying text. 
 133 Cf. Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 3 n.2 (noting that “gender bias can oc-
cur alongside other types of unlawful discrimination, including racial bias, exacerbating any deficien-
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and biased policing tends to produce both over- and under-inclusive practices. 
Apart from providing an extraordinary vantage on the intersectional nature of 
unequal protection, the Justice Department findings in the pre-Missoula cases 
reveal how the under-policing of gender violence finally came to matter. Close 
attention to these findings exposes subtle differences in enforcement actions 
that on first glance look similar; together, the findings show how ideas about 
the contours of accountability take shape.134 
1. Maricopa County, Arizona 
The Justice Department’s three-year investigation of the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”)135 was initiated in March 2009 and ultimately re-
sulted in the filing of a federal suit.136 A letter extensively documenting inves-
tigators’ findings137 concluded that MCSO was engaged in a “pattern or prac-
tice of unconstitutional policing” of Latinos that included racial profiling, un-
lawful detentions, and unlawful arrests.138 Police were between four to nine 
times more likely to stop Latino drivers than similarly situated non-Latino 
drivers,139 and the vast majority of “immigration-related” stops were pretextu-
al.140 
                                                                                                                           
cies in the criminal justice system’s response to reports of sexual assault and domestic violence and 
further undermining access to safety for those victims”). 
 134 Thanks to Rachel Harmon for raising this possibility. 
 135 PEREZ, supra note 130, at 1. 
During our investigation, aided by four leading police practice experts, one jail expert, 
and an expert on statistical analysis, we reviewed tens of thousands of pages of docu-
mentary evidence; toured MCSO’s jails; and interviewed over 400 individuals, includ-
ing approximately 150 former and current MCSO jail inmates, and more than 75 former 
and current MCSO personnel, including the Sheriff, the Chief of Enforcement, the 
Chief of Patrol, the Administrative Investigative Commander, the Sergeant heading 
MCSO’s Criminal Employment Squad, and the Lieutenant heading MCSO’s Human 
Smuggling Unit. 
Id. 
 136 Id. at 1 n.1. Unlike most Justice Department interventions, including the others described here, 
this enforcement action was treated by the targeted law enforcement agency as adversarial rather than 
cooperative. Id. (noting that MCSO “repeatedly refused to provide the United States with access to 
pertinent material and personnel,” resulting in litigation that was ultimately resolved). After the Jus-
tice Department issued its findings letter, it was unable to reach an agreement with MCSO, and it filed 
suit. Id. 
 137 See id. at 5–17. Many of these conclusions are reiterated in the complaint that was filed in 
federal court. See Complaint at 1, U.S. v. Maricopa County, No. 2:12-cv-00981-LOA (D. Ariz. May 
10, 2012). 
 138 See PEREZ, supra note 130, at 2. Other documented unconstitutional practices included unlaw-
ful retaliation and operation of the jails in a manner that discriminated against Latinos with limited 
English proficiency. Id. 
 139 Id. at 6. 
 140 Id. at 6–7. 
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 In addition to these and other constitutional violations, the Justice De-
partment identified additional “areas of serious concern,” including the 
“[r]eduction of policing services to the Latino community,” and “[g]ender 
and/or national origin bias by failing to investigate sex crimes.”141 Of particu-
lar note, more than four hundred cases of sexual assault and child molestation 
“were not property investigated over a three-year period ending in 2007.”142 
Moreover, “many of the victims [in these cases] may have been Latino.”143 
In sum, discriminatory policing in Maricopa County was not simply a 
matter of too much or too little.144 Rather, bias tended to lead to both overen-
forcement and underenforcement; in each case, equal protection norms were 
undermined.145 The Justice Department findings expressly captured this dy-
namic, noting connections between the reduction of policing services to Lati-
nos, the failure to adequately investigate sex crimes, and MCSO’s unconstitu-
tional practices of disproportionately stopping, detaining, and arresting Lati-
nos.146 As the report emphasized: 
A deliberate failure to provide policing services, or a deliberate in-
difference to public safety needs of certain communities, implicates 
important constitutional protections . . . . It does not matter for the 
purposes of the Constitution and federal laws whether it is an act of 
commission or omission.147 
2. Puerto Rico 
In the fall of 2011, the Justice Department announced findings from its 
extensive investigation into the Puerto Rico Police Department (“PRPD”).148 
According to the report, PRPD was “broken in a number of critical and fun-
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. at 14–15. An additional area of concern was the use of excessive force against Latinos. Id. 
at 15. 
 142 Id. at 16. The Justice Department noted that it would continue to investigate any allegations 
that this practice continued after 2007. Id. 
 143 Id. (alteration in original). The Justice Department added: “If established, this may constitute a 
failure to provide police services in a manner that constitutes gender and/or national origin discrimina-
tion in violation of the Equal Protection guarantee of the United States Constitution.” Id. 
 144 See supra notes 7–14 and accompanying text. 
 145 See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Files Law-
suit in Arizona Against Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Joseph Ar-
paio (May 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-lawsuit-arizona-against-
maricopa-county-maricopa-county-sheriff-s [https://perma.cc/VEG9-Q8V6] (characterizing MCSO 
practices as resulting from a “culture of disregard for Latinos” and describing a “culture of bias” that 
contributes to discriminatory policing). 
 146 PEREZ, supra note 130, at 15–16. 
 147 Id. at 15; see supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting scholarly critiques of the state 
action requirement). 
 148 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE PUERTO RICO POLICE DE-
PARTMENT, supra note 130. 
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damental respects,”149 with biased policing a particular problem.150 In addition 
to pervasive discrimination against Dominican community members—
discrimination that encompassed excessive force and unjustified stops151—the 
Justice Department uncovered indicators of gender bias.152 Citing the underre-
porting of sex crimes153 and a “longstanding failure to effectively address do-
mestic violence and rape,”154 the report expressed “serious concerns” about 
PRPD’s response to sexual assault.155 
Ultimately the PRPD and the Justice Department reached a settlement156 
governing both the over-policing and the under-policing that results from bi-
as.157 Guidelines for the investigation of sexual assault allegations require po-
                                                                                                                           
 149 Id. at 2. 
 150 See id. at 55. The Department of Justice emphasized that: 
[d]iscriminatory policing can take many forms, including reliance on bias-based profil-
ing, in which an officer impermissibly decides whom to stop, search, or arrest based 
upon characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or national origin. It can also include in-
stances in which a law enforcement agency targets certain communities using particular 
enforcement and crime prevention tactics on the basis of stereotypes or biased decision-
making. 
Id. 
 151 Id. at 55–56. 
 152 Id. at 57. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 58. 
 155 Id. at 57.  
Based on our investigation, we have serious concerns that PRPD is failing to adequately 
address sexual assault in Puerto Rico and to prevent and address domestic violence 
committed by PRPD officers. While we do not currently have sufficient evidence to 
find that PRPD systematically denies adequate policing services to women, we believe 
there are sufficient indicators of a problem to require immediate and sustained remedial 
efforts. 
Id. As the Justice Department insisted, “A law enforcement agency that systematically fails to address 
the needs of discrete, recognized communities violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 58. 
 156 See Agreement for the Sustainable Reform of the Puerto Rico Police Department at 1, U.S. v. 
Puerto Rico, No. 3:12-cv-2039 (D.P.R. July 17, 2013) [hereinafter Agreement]; Joint Motion Submit-
ting Agreement and Requesting a Stay of Proceedings at 1, U.S. v. Puerto Rico, No. 3:12-cv-2039 
(D.P.R. Dec. 21, 2012). The agreement requires the parties to select a Technical Compliance Advisor 
to assess and report whether the terms have been implemented, as well as “whether this implementa-
tion is resulting in constitutional and effective policing, professional treatment of individuals, and 
increased community trust of PRPD.” Agreement, supra note 156, at 71. 
 157 See, e.g., Agreement, supra note 156, at 38. 
PRPD shall apply and administer all programs, initiatives, and activities without dis-
criminating on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, disa-
bility, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or political ideology or af-
filiation. PRPD shall develop policies and practices to prohibit selective enforcement or 
non-enforcement of the law based on these characteristics. 
Id. For the provisions pertaining to equal protection, see id. at 36–40. 
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lice to operate in a manner “free of gender-based bias,”158 while specifically 
mandating the creation of policies and procedures based on recognized mod-
els159 and the tracking of all investigative outcomes.160 A comprehensive eval-
uation of PRPD’s progress in implementing the terms of the agreement is due 
in 2020.161 
3. Newark, New Jersey 
In July 2014, the Justice Department reported findings from its three-year 
investigation of the Newark Police Department (“NPD”).162 The investigation 
was triggered by allegations of excessive force and discriminatory stops and 
arrests,163 all of which eventually would be documented.164 The Justice De-
partment’s ultimate determination, however, was that problems with NPD were 
even more far reaching than initially suspected.165 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Id. at 40. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 41. 
 161 See id. at 84–85; see also Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, District Court 
Approves Selection of Arnaldo Claudio as Technical Compliance Advisor to Oversee Critical Re-
forms of Puerto Rico Police Department (June 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/district-court-
approves-selection-arnaldo-claudio-technical-compliance-advisor-oversee [https://perma.cc/6ZX9-
NZ2H]. 
 162 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 130, at 7–45. The Justice 
Department opened the investigation, which it conducted jointly with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 
the District of New Jersey, after receiving “serious allegations of civil rights violations by the NPD, 
including that the NPD subjects Newark residents to excessive force, unwarranted stops, and arrests, 
and discriminatory police actions.” Id. at 1. The investigation consisted of  
intensive on-site review of NPD practices and procedures. The team conducted inter-
views and meetings with NPD officers, supervisors, and command staff, and participat-
ed in “ride-alongs” with officers and supervisors. The team also met with representa-
tives of police fraternal organizations, conducted numerous community meetings, met 
with advocates and other individuals, and interviewed a wide array of local, regional, 
and federal stakeholders in the Newark criminal justice system, including representa-
tives of the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office (“ECPO”), the Essex County Public De-
fender’s Office, the Newark Municipal Prosecutor’s Office, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. The team set up a toll-free number and email address to receive infor-
mation related to the NPD. The DOJ also worked with NPD’s contracted data manage-
ment vendor to obtain substantial amounts of data related to NPD stops and arrests. 
Id. at 5. 
 163 Id. at 1. 
 164 Id. at 8–11. 
 165 See id. at 1.  
[T]his investigation showed a pattern or practice of constitutional violations in the 
NPD’s stop and arrest practices, its response to individuals’ exercise of their rights un-
der the First Amendment, the Department’s use of force, and theft by officers. The in-
vestigation also revealed deficiencies in the NPD’s systems that are designed to prevent 
and detect misconduct, including its systems for reviewing force and investigating 
complaints regarding officer conduct. The investigation also identified concerns that do 
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Discriminatory practices were widespread. Newark’s black residents 
“[bore] the brunt of the NPD’s pattern of unconstitutional policing,”166 includ-
ing unconstitutional stop practices,167 unconstitutional arrests,168 and unconsti-
tutional searches.169 The disparity between the treatment of black residents and 
their white and Hispanic counterparts was “stark and unremitting.”170 Without 
insisting that this disparity reflected intentional race discrimination,171 the Jus-
tice Department emphasized that “regardless of why the disparity occurs, the 
impact is clear: . . .”172 “black residents, and particularly black men, fear law 
enforcement action, regardless of whether such action is warranted by individ-
ualized suspicion.”173 
NPD’s discriminatory practices encompassed more than over-policing.174 
Gender-biased under-policing175 and under-policing related to sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity were identified as separate areas of concern.176 The 
                                                                                                                           
not appear to amount to patterns of constitutional misconduct, but which nonetheless 
are significant and warrant consideration by the NPD. These concerns relate to the 
NPD’s practices in dealing with potentially suicidal detainees, the NPD’s sexual assault 
investigations, and the impact of the NPD’s policing on the LGBT community. 
Id.; see also id. at 2–3 (summarizing evidence of unconstitutional practices). The remainder of the 
discussion centers on concerns related to equal protection. 
 166 Id. at 2, 17 (alteration in original). 
 167 Id. at 8–11. 
 168 See id. at 11–16. 
 169 Id. at 15–16. 
 170 Id. at 16. For example,  
Approximately 80% of the NPD’s stops and arrests have involved black individuals, 
while Newark’s population is only 53.9% black. Black residents of Newark are at least 
2.5 times more likely to be subjected to a pedestrian stop or arrested than white individ-
uals. Between January 2009 and June 2012, this translated into 34,153 more stops of 
black individuals than white individuals. The disparity persists throughout the city re-
gardless of whether sectors
 
have highly concentrated black residential populations or 
comparatively fewer black residents. 
Id. 
 171 Id. at 16; see supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of estab-
lishing intentional discrimination under the Court’s equal protection framework). 
 172 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 130, at 17. 
 173 Id. The Justice Department added: “This undeniable experience of being disproportionately 
affected by the NPD’s unconstitutional policing helps explain the community distrust and cynicism 
that undermines effective policing in Newark.” Id. 
 174 Id. at 22, 30. The findings also detailed a “pattern or practice of unconstitutional force in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment” and a “pattern or practice of theft from civilians.” Id. 
 175 Id. at 46–47. 
 176 Id. at 48. A list of other “potential issues or deficiencies . . . that warrant[ed] further examina-
tion by the NPD” included the inadequate attention given by police to detainee’s vulnerability to sui-
cide. Id. at 46–48. (alteration in original). With respect to each of these additional issues, the available 
evidence did “not support a finding of a pattern or practice of misconduct,” but still rose to the level of 
concern. Id. at 46. For a discussion of the difficulty of establishing intentional discrimination under 
the Court’s equal protection framework, see supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text. 
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practice of gender-biased policing encompassed “crucial deficiencies” in the 
way NPD handled sexual assault complaints.177 As the Justice Department ex-
plained: 
This deficiency is, in part, grounded in what appears to be ignorance 
or bias concerning victims of sexual assault, as evidenced by com-
ments made by several command staff during interviews and a review 
of a sample of sexual assault investigative files. Specifically, there is 
evidence that some NPD officers and detectives have made mistaken 
assumptions about who can or cannot be a “true” victim of sexual as-
sault. This includes views that sex workers, employees of nightclubs 
or adult establishments, and women who consumed alcohol with an 
assailant cannot be legitimate sexual assault claimants.178 
The Justice Department further found “anecdotal evidence” that NPD had 
“engaged in discriminatory policing practices based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity,” which included a “lack of responsiveness to complaints about 
violent assaults against LGBT individuals.”179 
The report closed by noting that NPD and the City of Newark had 
reached an agreement designed to remedy problems identified by the Justice 
Department investigation.180 The agreement includes a section on “Bias Free 
Policing” that requires NPD to collect and review data on race, ethnicity and 
gender, and to “incorporate regular analysis of this data into its routine opera-
tional decisions.”181 The department is also obligated to provide training “that 
sufficiently addresses the prevention of bias based on race, ethnicity, national 
origin, sexual orientation, gender and gender identity.”182 Importantly, training 
must “not focus solely on the effects of bias on the subjects of law enforcement 
                                                                                                                           
 177 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 130, at 46. 
 178Id. According to the Justice Department, “The NPD’s problematic response to sexual assault 
complaints is also structural, embedded in procedural problems with the way the NPD has handled 
sexual assault investigations.” Id. These problematic procedures included a lack of support for vic-
tims, premature closure of investigations, and a tendency to “ignore basic investigatory steps, such as 
checking the alleged assailant’s criminal record even when the assailant’s name and date of birth are 
known.” Id. at 47. 
 179 Id. at 48. The Justice Department also found “harassment of female transgender persons by 
NPD officers—including the mistaken assumption that all female transgender persons are prostitutes.” 
Id. In this case, the same population was at once subjected to both overenforcement and underen-
forcement of the laws. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (describing this dynamic). 
 180 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 130, at 48; see supra note 123 
and accompanying text (noting the importance of police department cooperation to the success of 
enforcement actions to date). 
 181 City of Newark and United States of America Agreement in Principle 5 (July 22, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/newark_prinagree_7-22-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/H86T-
VSR4]. 
 182 Id. “The curriculum will include discussion of the causes of bias, as well as strategies to avoid 
and mitigate its effects.” Id. 
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activity, but will also address officers’ interactions with victims of crime, such 
as the potential impacts of bias in the response to and in the investigation of 
sexual assaults.”183 
In Newark, the Justice Department recognized that both underenforce-
ment and overenforcement are corollaries of discrimination. 
4. New Orleans, Louisiana 
The 2011 Justice Department investigation into the New Orleans Police 
Department (“NOPD”)184 resulted in a two-part conclusion: “In the absence of 
mechanisms to protect and promote civil rights, officers too frequently use ex-
cessive force and conduct illegal stops, searches and arrests with impunity. In 
addition, the Department’s culture tolerates and encourages under-enforcement 
and under-investigation of violence against women.”185 
The Justice Department determined that NOPD engaged in a “pattern or 
practice of discriminatory policing,” which occurred “when police officers and 
departments unfairly enforce the law—or fail to enforce the law—based on 
characteristics such as race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion, or LGBT 
status.”186  
                                                                                                                           
 183 Id. 
 184 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DE-
PARTMENT, supra note 130 (providing summary of the Department of Justice’s findings regarding the 
New Orleans Police Department). For a summary of the investigation’s scope, see Consent Decree 
Regarding the New Orleans Police Department at 2, U.S. v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-
SM-JCW (E.D. La. July 24, 2012). The summary notes that  
[a]s part of its investigation, DOJ, in conjunction with its police-practices consultants, 
conducted a detailed fact-finding review, including numerous tours of NOPD facilities; 
interviews with New Orleans officials, NOPD command staff, supervisors, and police 
officers; review of more than 36,000 pages of documents; and meetings with residents, 
community groups, and other stakeholders within the City. In addition, DOJ participat-
ed in detailed exit interviews between its police-practices consultants and NOPD offi-
cials following each investigatory tour. 
See id. 
 185 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra 
note 130, at v. 
 186 Id. at 31 (emphasis added). For instance,  
Discriminatory policing may take the form of bias-based profiling, in which an officer 
decides whom to stop, search, or arrest based upon one of the above-mentioned charac-
teristics, rather than on the subject’s behavior or on credible information identifying the 
subject as having engaged in criminal activity. Denying police services to some persons 
or communities because of bias or stereotypes, or failing to take meaningful steps to 
enable communication, also constitute discriminatory policing. Discriminatory policing 
may also result when a police department selects particular enforcement and crime pre-
vention tactics in certain communities or against certain individuals for reasons moti-
vated by bias or stereotype. 
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 In the realm of overenforcement, the Justice Department uncovered 
“troubling disparities in treatment of the City’s African-American communi-
ty,”187 along with evidence that Latino residents were often stopped “for un-
known reasons or for minor offenses that would not ordinarily merit police 
attention.”188 Members of the LGBT community were targeted for prostitution 
arrests, and police would reportedly charge transgender residents with solicit-
ing “crimes against nature,” which required sex offender registration upon 
conviction.189 
On the underenforcement side, the Justice Department found that 
“[i]nadequate policies and procedures, deficiencies in training, and extraordi-
nary lapses in supervision” had resulted in a “systemic breakdown in NOPD 
handling of sexual assault investigations.”190 Misclassification of “large num-
bers of possible sexual assaults” translated into a “sweeping failure to properly 
investigate” these cases.191 Even where sexual assault complaints were pur-
sued, “the investigations were seriously deficient” and “replete with stereotyp-
ical assumptions and judgments about sex crimes and victims of sex crimes, 
including misguided commentary about the victims’ perceived credibility [and] 
sexual history.”192 
The extensive designation of sexual assault allegations as “Signal 21s,”193 
or non-criminal complaints, was especially problematic.194 In the “vast majori-
                                                                                                                           
See id. at 31–32. The Justice Department found that NOPD engaged in numerous patterns of unconsti-
tutional conduct, including the infliction of excessive force and violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
See id. at 1–30. 
 187 Id. at 35. 
 188 Id. at 36. NOPD routinely questioned Latino residents regarding their immigration status, 
resulting in a “strong belief among some segments of the Latino community that reporting crime to 
NOPD may subject the reporter to unwanted attention or harassment. As one participant in a commu-
nity meeting told [investigators]: ‘Out of fear, we stay quiet.’” Id. (alteration in original). 
 189 Id. As the Justice Department’s description illustrates, this policing practice discriminated 
across multiple dimensions of vulnerability: 
Persons convicted only of soliciting crimes against nature make up nearly 40 percent of 
the Orleans Parish sex offender registry. NOPD is charged with monitoring all regis-
trants’ compliance with sex offender registry requirements, raising questions about effi-
cient and effective use of resources to ensure public safety. Further, for the already vul-
nerable transgender community, inclusion on the sex offender registry further stigma-
tizes and marginalizes them, complicating efforts to secure jobs, housing, and obtain 
services at places like publicly-run emergency shelters. Of the registrants convicted of 
solicitation of a crime against nature, 80 percent are African American, suggesting an 
element of racial bias as well. Indeed, community members told us they believe some 
officers equate being African American and transgender with being a prostitute. 
Id. at 36–37. 
 190 Id. at 43; see id. at 49–51 (summarizing NOPD’s inadequate response to domestic violence). 
 191 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra 
note 130, at 43. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 45. 
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ty” of these cases, sex crimes detectives would complete a Major Offense Re-
port (“MORF”) and take no further action.195 As one detective acknowledged, 
“If we can prove that the allegation is false during the initial investigation,  
that’s a MORF.”196 Consistent with this orientation, “the Signal 21 reports of-
ten expressed skepticism about victims’ credibility” and “opined on victims’ 
possible motivations for lying.”197 In interviews, “detectives asked leading or 
blaming questions,”198 relying on “stereotypes regarding how a victim behaves 
in a ‘real’ case of rape.”199 
The parties ultimately reached a settlement and, in early 2013, a consent 
decree was entered that provides for close independent monitoring to ensure that 
the NOPD complies with the terms.200 The 124-page order includes a section on 
“bias-free policing” that requires comprehensive annual training to “emphasize 
that discriminatory policing in the form of either selective enforcement or non-
enforcement of the law, including the selection or rejection of particular tactics 
or strategies based upon stereotypes or bias, is prohibited.”201 
                                                                                                                           
 194 Id. For example: 
By mid-August 2010, the Unit had classified 81 out of 184 complaints of possible sex-
ual assault received in 2010, or about 44 percent, as Signal 21s. In the vast majority of 
these cases, sex crimes detectives filled out a Major Offense Report Form (“MORF”), 
coded the disposition as “NAT,” or “Necessary Action Taken,” and undertook no fur-
ther review, victim follow-up, or investigation. 
Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 46. The Justice Department underscored that the Signal 21 reports that were reviewed 
“clearly reflected a focus on and effort to, from the outset, ‘prove an allegation is false’—a conclusion 
that is virtually impossible to draw based on a cursory investigation or preliminary victim interview.” 
Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. Investigators often questioned victims about why they did not resist and why they “put 
themselves in certain situations.” Id. 
 199 Id. at 47. Here is one example of this dynamic: 
In one interview, of a teenager who reported being assaulted by her mother’s boyfriend, 
the detective wrote that the “victim was asked if she resisted and asked to explain. The 
victim stated that she told him to stop and he didn’t. She stated she didn’t yell or 
scream, nor did she try to use her cell phone to call her mom or the police. The victim 
states that the accused never threatened or implied to have a weapon or cause her physi-
cal harm. In fact, the victim states that accused is smaller than her in weight and around 
the same height.” The detective also noted that the “victim’s demeanor and her moth-
er’s were very nonchalant and unwavered by the police inquisition.” 
See id. at 47–48 (emphasis added). 
 200 See Consent Decree, supra note 184, at 108–22 (outlining measures of implementation and 
enforcement and specifically defining the role of a monitor). 
 201 Id. at 48. Several provisions are aimed at remedying the over-policing of Latinos and 
transgender residents. See, e.g., id. at 50 (noting that officers may not “construe sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or gender expression as reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an individual is or 
has engaged in any crime.”). 
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A section on “policing free of gender bias” outlines a framework for im-
proving NOPD policies and procedures governing sexual assault.202 The exten-
sive list of areas that the department must address includes documentation, 
victim interviews, on-scene and follow-up investigation, evidence collection, 
and training on responding to non-stranger assault.203 As well, specific proto-
cols for coding sexual assaults limit the discretion afforded patrol officers and 
detectives, along with imposing substantially heightened supervision and 
transparency.204 Finally, NOPD must incorporate a set of accepted best practic-
es for investigating violence against women.205 
The most recent monitoring report found cause for cautious optimism.206 
Although many of the reforms detailed in the consent decree are still unreal-
ized, progress has been made. As the Monitor concluded, “Change is coming. 
Some will resist it, but it is coming regardless.”207 
B. The Paradigm: Missoula, Montana 
In the spring of 2013, the Justice Department issued findings in a § 14141 
enforcement action that, for the first time, exclusively concentrated on the dis-
criminatory policing of sexual assault.208 
A year earlier, the Justice Department had launched a comprehensive, sys-
tem-wide investigation into the underenforcement of rape law in Missoula, 
Montana.209 At the time, Attorney General Eric Holder cautioned, “The allega-
                                                                                                                           
 202 Id. at 54–57; see id. at 58–60 (addressing the policing of domestic violence). 
 203 Id. at 55–56. 
 204 Id. at 56. 
 205 Id. at 55. For a more detailed description of the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(“IACP”) guidelines, which were expressly referenced in the NOPD agreement, see infra note 246 and 
accompanying text. 
 206 See New Orleans Consent Decree Monitor Third Quarterly Report 75 (Aug. 31, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/nopd_3rdmtr_8-31-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/H47L-
WGB5 ] (“The positive developments noted throughout this report and our prior reports fuel our op-
timism. Our optimism, however, is not without reservation.”). 
 207 Id. at 76. 
 208 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 3. In a brief footnote, the letter contained reference to 
the precursors of Missoula. Id. at 3 n.6 (“In the past five years, the Special Litigation Section has 
investigated and publicly issued findings regarding the response to sexual assault by four law en-
forcement agencies: New Orleans (LA) Police Department, the Maricopa County (AZ) Sheriff’s Of-
fice; [and] the Puerto Rico Police Department . . . .”) (alteration in original). Although the Newark 
Police Department was already under investigation, findings in the case had not yet been issued. See 
supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 209 In addition to initiating a Title IX investigation of the University of Montana, the Justice De-
partment simultaneously announced that it had opened a pattern or practice investigation into the 
University of Montana’s Office of Public Safety (“OPS”), the Missoula Police Department (“MPD”) 
and the Missoula County Attorney’s Office. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Jus-
tice, Justice Department Announces Investigations of the Handling of Sexual Assault Allegations by the 
University of Montana, the Missoula, Mont., Police Department and the Missoula County Attorney’s 
Office (May 1, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-investigations-
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tions that the University of Montana, the local police department and the 
County Attorney’s Office failed to adequately address sexual assaults are very 
disturbing.”210 
As the investigation progressed, it became clear that gender bias was in-
deed undermining the response of the Missoula Police Department (“MPD”) to 
sexual assault.211 In May 2013, the Justice Department issued a report finding 
that “deficiencies in MPD’s response to sexual assault compromise the effec-
tiveness of sexual assault investigations from the outset, make it more difficult 
to uncover the truth, and have the effect of depriving female sexual assault vic-
tims of basic legal protections.”212 Also in May 2013, the Justice Department 
entered into a settlement with MPD, which had cooperated with the investiga-
tion from the outset.213 
Two years later, the Justice Department announced that MPD had fully 
implemented the terms of the agreement and “achieved the overall purpose of 
the agreement,” to improve the police response to sexual assault.214 The head 
                                                                                                                           
handling-sexual-assault-allegations-university [https://perma.cc/TGH7-BR5N]. As the Justice De-
partment characterized it at the time, the comprehensive investigation would “focus on allegations that 
OPS, MPD and the Missoula County Attorney’s Office are failing to adequately investigate and pros-
ecute alleged sexual assaults against women in Missoula, due to gender discrimination.” See id. The 
remainder of this discussion describes the Justice Department’s findings and ensuing action with re-
spect to the police department, in particular. For resolution of the investigations into the University of 
Montana and the County Attorney’s Office (the latter of which followed prolonged non-cooperation 
by the County Attorney), see generally Memorandum of Understanding Between, the Montana Attor-
ney General, The Missoula County Attorney’s Office, Missoula County, and the United States De-
partment of Justice (June 10, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoula_
settle_6-10-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/78WR-DCJV]; Memorandum of Agreement Between the United 
States Department of Justice and the University of Montana Regarding the University of Montana 
Office of Public Safety’s Response to Sexual Assault (May 9, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
spl/documents/missoulasettle_5-9-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAM9-J2YC]. 
 210 Press Release, supra note 209. Despite rapid, widespread association of the city as the “Rape 
Capital of America,” Missoula’s sexual assault statistics, troubling as they were, were not aberration-
al. Katie J.M. Baker, My Weekend in America’s So-Called Rape Capital, JEZEBEL (May 10, 2012), 
http://jezebel.com/5908472/my-weekend-in-americas-so-called-rape-capital [https://perma.cc/9XPH-
GVXM] (citing statistics showing that rapes in Missoula appeared to be “on par with national averag-
es for college town’s of Missoula’s size”). In reality, “Missoula is just like any other college town. 
What is happening in Missoula can—and is—happening all around us.” See id. 
 211 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 1. For resolution of the investigations into the Universi-
ty of Montana and the County Attorney’s Office (the latter of which followed the initiation of adver-
sarial proceedings by the County Attorney), see generally Memorandum of Understanding Between, 
the Montana Attorney General, supra note 209. 
 212 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 1. 
 213 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of Justice and the City 
of Missoula Regarding the Missoula Police Department’s Response to Sexual Assault 1 (May 13, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoulapdsettle_5-15-13.pdf [https://perma.
cc/N97F-4XP6]. 
 214 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Mis-
soula Police Department Has Fully Implemented Agreement to Improve Response to Reports of Sex-
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of the Civil Rights Division, Deputy Attorney General Vanita Gupta, was effu-
sive in her appraisal, suggesting: 
[A]s a result of these reforms, the women of Missoula are safer, 
more trusting of the criminal justice system, and subject to more fair 
and respectful treatment by local law enforcement. Missoula’s po-
lice department had the courage and leadership to acknowledge that 
it had a problem and to address it, and as a result, is poised to be-
come a model for communities struggling with these issues around 
the country.215 
Missoula is a landmark intervention. It introduces a novel way of catalyz-
ing the enforcement of rape law—a development well worth examining, espe-
cially for what it portends.216 Missoula also represents a significant conceptual 
breakthrough because it is premised on an understanding of gender-based un-
der-policing as an equal protection violation; one demanding a federal re-
sponse. 
Before positioning the case of Missoula in this wider context, I examine 
MPD’s turnaround. As will become clear, the gender bias that existed within 
the police ranks prior to the Justice Department’s involvement is unusually 
well documented, though it is not inconsistent with the results of other investi-
gations.217 The terms of the settlement are unprecedented, however, as is the 
collaboration’s apparent success in improving the police response to sexual 
violence.218 As a blueprint for remedying underenforcement, Missoula war-
rants attention and analysis. 
1. The Findings 
The Justice Department trained its sights on Missoula after learning of a 
number  of sexual assault allegations that were investigated inappropriately.219 
                                                                                                                           
ual Assault (May 11, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-missoula-
police-department-has-fully-implemented-agreement [https://perma.cc/3DNX-6J5U]. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See infra note 269 (discussing how under-policing can give rise to discriminatory policing and 
thus a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 217 See supra notes 206–264 and accompanying text. 
 218 See infra notes 261–265 and accompanying text. 
 219 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 2. A series of articles by local reporter Gwen Florio 
began to expose a failed systemic response to sexual assault. See, e.g., Gwen Florio, Missoula Police: 
2nd Attack May Be Linked to Alleged Sex Assault Involving UM Football Players, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 
20, 2011), http://missoulian.com/news/local/missoula-police-nd-attack-may-be-linked-to-alleged-
sex/article_d261cb6e-2aca-11e1-9033-0019bb2963f4.html [https://perma.cc/K9WJ-D2NT]; Gwen 
Florio, Student Says She Was Sexually Assaulted by UM Football Players; County Filed No Charges, 
MISSOULIAN (Dec. 21, 2011), http://missoulian.com/news/local/student-says-she-was-sexually-
assaulted-by-um-football-players/article_5fd79f90-2b8f-11e1-a73a-0019bb2963f4.html [https://
perma.cc/MTQ5-REJC]; Gwen Florio, UM Football Players Allegedly Involved in Sexual Assault on 
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Based on its poor handling of rape cases, MPD was widely perceived as deny-
ing women access to justice. As a result, many victims of sexual assault, col-
lege students and non-college students alike, were opting not to report the 
crime to the police.220 
The Justice Department’s investigation, with which MPD was fully coop-
erative,221 was comprehensive. The review entailed interviews with law en-
forcement officers, advocates, witnesses, and community members; an evalua-
tion of policies, training materials, and court filings; and a thorough examina-
tion of the case files for the more than 350 reports of sexual assault received by 
MPD from January 2008 to May 2012.222 While this effort was underway, the 
Justice Department was also investigating deficient responses to sexual assault 
on the part of both the University of Montana and the Missoula County Attor-
ney’s Office.223 
In May 2013, the Justice Department issued a letter detailing “practices 
that undermine [MPD’s] ability to fully and fairly investigate reports of sexual 
assault,” including “discourag[ing] female victims of sexual assault from co-
operating with law enforcement.”224 Notably, the investigation “showed that 
there is no legitimate law enforcement or other reason for these inadequacies. 
Rather, these investigative weaknesses appear due, at least in part, to stereo-
types and misinformation about women and victims of sexual assault.”225 The 
                                                                                                                           
Campus, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 16, 2011), http://missoulian.com/news/local/um-football-players-
allegedly-involved-in-sexual-assault-on-campus/article_265fbee2-27a6-11e1-8834-0019bb2963f4.
html [https://perma.cc/AJ6Z-DQPW]. Writer Jon Krakauer later popularized an account of several 
women who were sexually assaulted in Missoula during this same time period and, in various ways 
and to differing degrees, were failed by the University of Montana and by the criminal justice system. 
See generally JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA: RAPE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN A COLLEGE TOWN 
(2015) (describing experiences of women sexually assaulted in Missoula, Montana). 
 220 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 2; see supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the connection between the underenforcement of rape law and the underreporting of rape). 
 221 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 1 (“Given the cooperation and commitment to im-
provement demonstrated by MPD during the investigation, we have high confidence that MPD can 
correct the problems we identified quickly and effectively.”). 
 222 Id. at 4 (adding, “[w]e made every effort to confirm witness accounts, where possible, with 
other evidence, including police reports, transcripts, and video recordings of investigative interviews, 
and gave weight only to those statements we could corroborate or otherwise deem credible”). 
 223 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 224 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 6 (alteration in original). 
 225 Id. The Justice Department further declared: 
The deficiencies in MPD’s sexual assault investigations and its cooperation with law 
enforcement and community partners in the response to sexual assault have an unjusti-
fied disparate impact on women . . . . Further, the nature of these investigative deficien-
cies, e.g., inadequate probing of suspects’ accounts of alleged assaults, and a lack of 
support for women who report sexual assault, is in striking contrast to the quality of its 
investigations more generally, and indicates that these deficiencies may be motivated at 
least in part by gender-based stereotypes in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 11–12. 
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Justice Department concluded that MPD’s failed response to sexual assault 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.226 
a. Practices of Underenforcement 
Deficiencies in MPD’s sexual assault investigations were especially pro-
nounced in cases of non-stranger assault.227 Overall, officers “fail[ed] to em-
ploy” key techniques essential to proving the absence of consent, including 
collecting evidence,228 interviewing witnesses in a timely fashion,229 and ques-
tioning suspects.230 In particular, when handling drug- and alcohol-facilitated 
rapes, “officers often investigate[d] the allegations as if the victim alleged 
physical force had been used.”231 Unsurprisingly, weaknesses at the investiga-
tive stage “could substantially influence” a later decision not to pursue a 
case.232 
Related to these investigative practices, MPD detectives actively encour-
aged women not to participate in the criminal process.233 Sexual assault com-
plainants were routinely asked “at the outset” whether they wished to prose-
cute the case.234 As the Justice Department report observed, 
                                                                                                                           
 226 Id. at 6. The Justice Department also found MPD in violation of the Safe Streets Act. Id. (“Be-
cause the vast majority of victims of sexual assault are women, MPD’s failure to adequately respond 
to reports of sexual assault has an unjustified disparate impact on women and thus violates the Safe 
Streets Act.”); see infra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing the Safe Streets Act). 
 227 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 7. A subsequent analysis by MPD of its data (per its 
agreement with the Justice Department) showed that 80% of reported rapes were committed by a non-
stranger. Mike Brady, Chief, City of Missoula Police Dep’t, Remarks at U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press 
Conference (May 11, 2015), http://www.ci.missoula.mt.us/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/9040 
[https://perma.cc/AF7Y-DV7U]. 
 228 PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 7 (alteration in original). 
 229 Id. at 8.  
Our review also showed that MPD detectives all too often do not make sufficient efforts 
to obtain statements from suspects and witnesses quickly. For example, instead of con-
ducting field interviews in sexual assault cases, MPD detectives generally call to make 
appointments with suspects, scheduling them sometimes weeks or more in advance. 
They make no attempt to conduct telephone or field interviews to obtain preliminary in-
terviews in the interim. This practice undermines the integrity of sexual assault investi-
gations by denying detectives the ability to compare the suspect’s and victim’s accounts 
early on in the investigation, and by allowing suspects too much time to modify or co-
ordinate their stories. 
Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at 7 (alteration in original). 
 232 Id. at 8 (noting that the omission of relevant facts from a police officer’s report “could sub-
stantially influence both MPD’s and, later, MCAO’s determination about whether to seek criminal 
prosecution”). 
 233 Id.  
 234 Id. As the Justice Department explained, this practice substantially undermines the integrity of 
the investigative process, “increas[ing] the chance that the woman will decline to participate in the 
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Especially when a woman may already have encountered skepticism 
by responding officers and detectives, such a question may send the 
message that if she proceeds with her case she will be expected to be 
the driving force behind the prosecution; that she should already feel 
sufficiently well-informed and empowered to make the decision as 
to whether to seek prosecution; or that she should feel personally re-
sponsible for imposing serious criminal consequences on the assail-
ant.235 
The Justice Department determined that MPD’s pattern of sexual assault 
practices facilitated the ready exit of victims, and thus their cases, from the 
criminal process. 236 So, too, did this pattern of practices reflect the operation 
of gender-based stereotypes.237 
The implications were significant. In order to “fully address and correct 
the inadequacies of MPD’s response to reports of sexual assault,” it was essen-
tial for the department to explicitly confront the “role that gender stereotypes 
play in potentially compromising the law enforcement response.”238 
b. The Harm of Underenforcement 
For the first time in a § 14141 investigation, the Justice Department in 
Missoula explicitly described the harm of gender-based underenforcement.239 
Discriminatory policing “place[s] women at an increased risk of harm.”240 
Whenever “police refuse to investigate or arrest people who commit crimes 
                                                                                                                           
investigation, in some instances causing MPD to end its investigation before it has begun.” Id. at 9 
(alteration in original). 
 235 Id. at 8–9; see also id. at 14 (noting that MPD detectives tended to “overemphasize the emo-
tional toll of prosecution and minimize the seriousness of rape in their communications with women 
reporting sexual assault,” thereby deterring women from pursing a criminal case). 
 236 For a description of practices specifically deemed to “create unnecessary barriers to building 
trust and rapport with women reporting sexual assault, and make the process of reporting unnecessari-
ly burdensome for women,” see id. at 9. 
 237 This finding was expressed repeatedly. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he manner in which MPD conducted 
its investigations of reports of sexual assault was almost entirely subject to the discretion of MPD 
detectives, and thus was particularly susceptible to being influenced by MPD detectives’ stereotypes 
and assumptions about the victims of those assaults.”). In addition, the investigation “found that 
MPD’s interactions with women reporting sexual assault all too often reflect reliance on gender-based 
stereotypes and similar discrimination, and that this discrimination is responsible in part for the defi-
ciencies in MPD’s response to sexual assault.” Id. at 12. Furthermore, “MPD’s sexual assault practic-
es, taken together with statements made by MPD officers, indicate that MPD’s inadequate response to 
women’s reports of sexual assault occurs, at least in part, because of gender-based stereotypes.” Id. 
 238 Id. at 12; see supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing a disconnect between the 
operation of gender stereotypes and the test for purposeful discrimination). 
 239 This is apart from the more general observation that MPD’s inadequacies “compromise[d] the 
search for truth.” PEREZ &  COTTER, supra note 118, at 7 (alteration in original). 
 240 Id. 
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against a particular [protected class] . . . . Would-be criminals will act with a 
greater impunity,” and crimes against that group will increase.241 
The Missoula report raised another fundamental, albeit less tangible, dan-
ger: law enforcement practices that reflect discrimination also perpetuate it.242 
The Justice Department pointed to two features of this dynamic: stereotypes 
about women become further entrenched, and public confidence in the justice 
system, particularly its competence to remedy sexual assault, is undermined.243 
2. The Settlement 
In May 2013, the Justice Department resolved its investigation by enter-
ing into an agreement with MPD designed to improve its response to sexual 
assault, “including by combating gender bias.”244 A key component of the 
agreement required MPD to modify its policies and procedures to comport 
with best practices.245 Specifically, the department was mandated to incorpo-
rate the International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) Model Policy 
on Investigating Sexual Assaults.246 MPD was also required to conduct thor-
                                                                                                                           
 241 Id. (quoting Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 592 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010)) (alteration in orig-
inal). 
 242 See id. at 14 (“As is generally the case, in Missoula, constitutional policing and effective law 
enforcement go hand-in-hand: the same practices that prevent law enforcement from determining 
whether a sexual assault allegation is true often reflect or perpetuate gender discrimination.”). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 213, at 1. 
 245 Id. at 4. 
 246 Id. The IACP Model Policy, which is generally considered the gold standard for sexual assault 
investigations, addresses such topics as: 
a. Initial officer response to a report of sexual assault, including requirements specific 
to assisting the victim, evidence collection, and the identification and location of wit-
nesses;  
b. Response to stranger and non-stranger sexual assault;  
c. The preliminary victim interview, including the development of a victim interview 
protocol, and the comprehensive, follow-up victim interview;  
d. Contacting and interviewing suspects;  
e. Medical forensic examinations and coordination with the forensic examiner;  
f. Participation of victim advocates;  
g. Investigative considerations regarding alcohol and drug-facilitated sexual assault, in-
cluding requirements specific to evidence collection and the forensic examination of 
victims;  
h. The role of the supervisor; and  
i. Procedures for blind reporting of sexual assault. 
Id. See generally Sexual Assault Incident Reports, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/SexualAssaultGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FCE-3MTQ] 
(last visited July 29, 2016) (providing the entire policy). For a discussion of the settlement between 
the Justice Department and the New Orleans Police Department, specifically the requirement to incor-
porate IACP best practices, see Consent Decree, supra note 182, at 108–22 and accompanying text. 
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ough trainings on an ongoing basis;247 to enhance its investigation of non-
stranger sexual assault and alcohol- or drug-facilitated sexual assault;248 and to 
design a victim-centered response to increase the likelihood of victim partici-
pation.249 
In critical provisions on oversight, the agreement spelled out a range of 
mechanisms for limiting the discretion of MPD detectives to close an investi-
gation without an arrest.250 Cases not referred for prosecution would be closely 
scrutinized, both by internal supervisors251 and by an external review group.252 
In addition, MPD would be obliged to coordinate efforts with the University 
and with the County Attorney’s office,253 as well as to enhance its data collec-
tion, analysis, and reporting.254 
3. The Aftermath 
On May 11, 2015, the Justice Department announced that MPD had fully 
implemented the terms of its agreement.255 Deputy Attorney General Gupta 
heralded the community for “com[ing] together to institute long-term, systemic 
change.”256 This was, she added, “a success story.”257 
By a number of measures, the response to sexual assault had already im-
proved.258 Community advocates reported better communication and coordina-
                                                                                                                           
 247 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 213, at 5. 
 248 Id. at 7. 
 249 Id. at 8. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 11–12. 
 253 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 213, at 9. 
 254 Id. at 10. 
 255 Press Release, supra note 214. 
 256 Remarks, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Head of Civil Rights Division Vanita Gupta 
Delivers Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Missoula Police Department’s Full Compliance 
with Justice Department Agreement Over Response to Reports of Sexual Assault (May 11, 2015) 
(alteration in original), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/head-civil-rights-division-vanita-gupta-
delivers-remarks-press-conference-announcing [https://perma.cc/E968-VZ7Z]. 
 257 Id. As Deputy Attorney General Gupta remarked, “This multi-pronged approach to combating 
sexual assault from the campus to the courthouse door used all of our applicable civil rights laws (Ti-
tle IX, Title IV, the Safe Streets Act and Section 14141) and was unparalleled in its scope.” Id. Gupta 
added: 
I want to highlight that a common factor critical to all of the progress that we have seen 
across different agencies and agreements is the meaningful engagement of the commu-
nity providing input at every stage of our work—during the investigation, the develop-
ment of the agreement and now the implementation of the agreement. Under all of the 
agreements, the entities involved agreed to establish sustainable mechanisms that allow 
for input from key stakeholders about their practices and procedures. 
Id. 
 258 See Remarks, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney Michael W. Cotter De-
livers Remarks on the Missoula Police Department’s Full Compliance with Agreement (May 11, 
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tion with local law enforcement.259 Victim surveys indicated “significant satis-
faction with police officers’ and detectives’ treatment of victims reporting sex-
ual assault to law enforcement.”260 More rape victims were apparently disclos-
ing the crime to police261 and choosing to pursue their complaint.262 
It is too soon to tell whether changes in MPD investigative practices will 
endure263 and whether they will ultimately increase the prosecution of rape.264 
Regardless, the Justice Department undoubtedly accomplished many of its in-
tended goals,265 positioning Missoula as a prototype for future § 14141 ac-
tions.266 
                                                                                                                           
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/united-states-attorney-michael-w-cotter-delivers-remarks-
missoula-police-departments-full [https://perma.cc/5NYK-7JPN] (“Today, under new protocols, vic-
tims are heard, they are not blamed and they are no longer stereotyped.”). 
 259 Press Release, supra note 214. 
 260 Id. 
 261 See Brady, supra note 227. From 2012, when the department began improving its response, to 
2014, reports of rape to police more than doubled. Id. Because reports to victim advocates did not also 
increase during this period, the greater frequency of police reports was likely a reflection of height-
ened public trust in police, rather than the commission of more sexual assaults. See Keila Szpaller, 
Missoula Improves Process for Victims After Rape Crisis, MISSOULIAN (Apr. 19, 2015), 
http://missoulian.com/news/local/missoula-improves-process-for-victims-after-rape-crisis/article_
f13c9e79-3582-5ac4-b8a8-22f4f84b57b2.html [https://perma.cc/M9RE-AM7Q]. 
 262 See Brady, supra note 227 (reporting a 16% drop in cases ending with victim “discontinuing” 
the investigation). 
 263 See Szpaller, supra note 261 (reporting detective division captain’s insistence that the police 
department would not “go backwards and undo all of this work that we’ve accomplished”). For a 
cautionary perspective on § 14141 regulation generally, see Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-
Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 264 See Missoula Police Department Reforms Rape Case Procedures After Investigation, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 11, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/11/missoula-montana-
police-university-rape-reforms [https://perma.cc/K5QD-L2C9] (reporting that the Justice Department 
had not yet found an increased rate of prosecutions). Last spring, the county attorney suggested that it 
was still too soon to see changes in the prosecution rate, while emphasizing that her office had “made 
a huge shift from being process-driven to being victim-centered.” Id. Ideally, the incidence of rape 
would itself decrease as a result of reform. 
 265 The U.S. Attorney’s remarks were encouraging: 
When the Department of Justice demonstrated that gender bias was undermining Mis-
soula’s law enforcement response to sexual assault, both the Missoula Police and Uni-
versity of Montana immediately agreed to a broad set of fundamental changes that be-
gan to dramatically improve their ability to protect victims of sexual assault. These re-
forms have made the Missoula Police Department more accountable, transparent and 
credible. With accountability, transparency and credibility comes community trust. To-
day, the Missoula Police Department is stronger and trusted. 
Remarks, supra note 258. 
 266 See id. (“Missoula is a model for every town in this nation to emulate.”). 
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C. Inducing Reform 
In late 2015, the Justice Department reconfigured federal involvement in 
eliminating gender bias in local policing. Issuing new guidance for law en-
forcement,267 the Justice Department reiterated that gender bias in policing 
practices results in diminished protection268 and that discriminatory underen-
forcement implicates the Equal Protection Clause,269 along with various feder-
al funding provisions.270  
The document is notable for its explicit definition of gender bias and its 
recognition of how gender bias “undermines” the police response to sexual 
assault.271 The guidance proceeds to outline a set of “basic principles” for 
                                                                                                                           
 267 Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 3. 
The Department of Justice (department) is committed to assisting law enforcement 
agencies in their efforts to reduce sexual and domestic violence, and to administer jus-
tice when these crimes occur. . . . One critical part of improving [law enforcement 
agencies’] response to allegations of sexual assault and domestic violence is identifying 
and preventing gender bias in policing practices. 
Id. (alteration in original). Although the guidance also addresses law enforcement’s response to do-
mestic violence, this discussion centers on the provisions related to sexual assault. 
 268 Id. 
Gender bias in policing practices is a form of discrimination that may result in [law en-
forcement agencies] providing less protection to certain victims on the basis of gender, 
failing to respond to crimes that disproportionately harm people of a particular gender 
or offering reduced or less robust services due to reliance on gender stereotypes. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 269 Id. at 23. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits discriminatory enforce-
ment of the law. Discriminatory policing occurs when police officers and departments 
selectively enforce the law—or fail to enforce the law—based on characteristics such as 
race, color, national origin, sex or religion. Denying police services to some persons or 
communities due to bias or stereotypes related to these characteristics is a form of dis-
criminatory policing. 
Id. 
 270 Id. at 24–25. For a critical analysis of the Safe Streets Act and other federal funding provisions 
as mechanisms for reforming police practices, see generally Harmon, supra note 17. 
271 Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 3, 7–10. The guidance resulted from years 
of coordinated advocacy on the part of women’s rights organizations, beginning in 2009 with the 
formation of a group working to revive the VAWA civil rights remedy and to include in the legisla-
tion a provision that would hold law enforcement accountable for gender-biased policing. In 2011, 
several advocates met with representatives of the Justice Department and the White House to discuss 
implementing a path-breaking decision by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recom-
mending systemic reforms to eliminate gender bias in the policing of domestic violence and sexual 
assault. See generally Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. U.S.A., Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 80/11 (2011), available at http://ww3.lawschool.cornell.edu/AvonResources/USPU
12626EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TVA-NU8S]. In 2012, a small group of organizations met with rep-
resentatives from the Justice Department, calling for the issuance of guidance to law enforcement on 
how gender bias undermines the policing of domestic violence and sexual assault. In 2015, the group 
of organizations delivered to the Attorney General a letter, joined by eighty-eight national groups and 
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eliminating bias in investigations272 and to provide concrete illustrations of 
these principles in practice.273 Finally, the guidance urges law enforcement 
agencies to incorporate these principles into departmental policies, training 
programs and—perhaps most importantly—“supervision protocols and sys-
tems of accountability” that ensure officer compliance.274 
The Justice Department’s decision to issue this guidance is consistent 
with a next generation approach to “pattern or practice” enforcement of gender 
biased policing.275 Outside the context of a particular investigation, the De-
partment has now announced its position that police departments have a “legal 
obligation” to eliminate gender bias.276 Additionally, a set of principles has 
been articulated for assessing whether this obligation is satisfied.277 
                                                                                                                           
ninety-eight state and local organizations, urging the Justice Department to issue guidance on gender-
biased policing. Subsequent meetings between representatives of the Justice Department and the Po-
lice Executive Research Forum, along with the publication of a number of reports documenting the 
continuing effects of police bias in domestic violence and sexual assault investigations, culminated in 
the issuance of the December 2015 guidance. Along the way, efforts by the following participants and 
organizations (among others) were critical: Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Cristina Finch, Terry Fromson, 
Julie Goldscheid, Lisalyn Jacobs, Risa Kaufman, Lenora Lapidus, Vania Leveille, Sandra Park, Maya 
Raghu, Lynn Hecht Schafran, Carol Tracy, June Zeitlin; the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Amnes-
ty International, the Columbia Human Rights Institute, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Hu-
man Rights, Legal Momentum, and the Women’s Law Project. See generally E-mail from Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Director, National Judicial Education Program, Legal Momentum (July 17, 2016) (on file 
with author). 
 272 Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 4. For a summary of these recommenda-
tions, see supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
 273 As one example, the recommendation to “Treat All Victims with Respect and Employ Inter-
viewing Tactics That Encourage a Victim to Participate and Provide Facts About the Incident”—the 
principle—is demonstrated in practice with this admonition: 
[O]fficers should not make statements or engage in acts that indicate to the victim that 
they doubt the victim’s credibility, or that [they] otherwise exhibit any bias towards the 
victim based on gender. Such statements and judgments could include: stereotyped as-
sumptions about the truth of a reported assault (e.g., that women are likely to report 
“regretted sex” as rape, that transgender women and men are unlikely to be raped, that 
people engaged in prostitution cannot be raped, or that certain ethnicities or races are 
more “promiscuous”); automatically believing the alleged assailant’s claim that the sex 
was consensual; or subtly, even blatantly, coercing the victim to recant the allegation of 
sexual assault by blaming the victim for being assaulted or for making unwise or dan-
gerous choices. 
Gender Bias in Law Enforcement, supra note 6, at 12, 14 (alteration in original). 
 274 Id. at 4. 
 275 To be sure, the guidance does not explicitly adopt a new approach to accountability in the 
gendered underenforcement space. Instead, the document purports only to “reflect and further the 
department’s partnership with the police leaders, line officers and detectives who work tirelessly to 
ensure that policing is free from bias and to uphold the civil and human rights of the communities they 
serve,” while expressly disclaiming the creation of any enforceable rights or responsibilities. Id. at 3. 
 276 As the guidance explains, 
The department outlines these legal principles to help [law enforcement agencies] fur-
ther understand the source of their duty to eliminate policing practices that may be bi-
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Taken together, these moves tend to incentivize proactive departmental 
reform.278 By implementing the recommended guidance, an agency can avoid 
costly federal intervention.279 At the same time, the Justice Department, which 
lacks the resources needed to sue even a fraction of the departments engaged in 
unconstitutional patterns of policing280 can motivate the elimination of biased 
enforcement practices.281 
The effectiveness of this incentive structure hinges on the costs of federal 
intervention (including its likelihood) and the extent to which police depart-
ments take these costs into account.282 The impact of the guidance might also 
                                                                                                                           
ased. [Law enforcement agencies] that integrate the basic principles described in this 
guidance into their policies, trainings and practices will be able to respond to allega-
tions of sexual assault and domestic violence more effectively and will more readily 
fulfill their own legal obligations. 
Id. at 23 (alteration in original). 
 277 See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. By articulating its view of what police depart-
ments must do to identify and respond to gender bias, the Justice Department has “lower[ed] the in-
formation barriers to reform.” See Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing 
Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 54–55 (2012) (alteration in original). 
 278 See Harmon, supra note 120, at 49. Harmon argues that: 
the Justice Department can most easily reduce the costs of reform by reducing infor-
mation costs for police departments. Lowering the information costs of reform requires 
two tasks: (1) developing the relevant information on what causes and cures misconduct 
and (2) disseminating it to police leadership in a manner that facilitates departmental re-
form. 
Id. 
 279 Id. at 23–24 (explaining that the threat of a § 14141 investigation and lawsuit can increase the 
expected costs of misconduct and thereby induce proactive reform). 
 280 Harmon, supra note 277, at 44. 
[Section 14141] is expensive for the Department of Justice to employ. There are more 
than fifteen thousand local police departments and sheriff’s offices in the United States. 
Assuming even a small minority of them is engaged in a pattern or practice of constitu-
tional violations, the Department of Justice cannot achieve national reform by suing 
every department with a pattern of widespread constitutional violations. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 281 Harmon, supra note 120, at 23. 
There are three primary ways in which the Justice Department can promote reform by 
changing the cost/benefit calculus of misconduct and reform for departments. It can: (1) 
raise the expected costs of engaging in misconduct; (2) lower the costs of preventing 
misconduct; and (3) raise the benefits of preventing misconduct. 
Id. My contention here is that the Department’s recently issued guidance on gender bias in policing 
effectively lowers prevention costs. Of course, the Justice Department might also raise the expected 
costs of discriminatory underenforcement and increase the benefits that accrue to departments that 
prevent (or curtail) such discrimination. How best to accomplish these goals merits separate consid-
eration. 
 282 See id. at 23–24. 
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depend on whether separate benefits flow to law enforcement agencies willing 
to proactively implement the recommended measures.283 In short, it remains to 
be seen whether the guidance does in fact trigger a new era of policing reform. 
Even so, the Justice Department’s most recent intervention is promising. 
As a starting proposition, this much was made incontestable: the underen-
forcement of rape law is a problem of constitutional dimension; unequal pro-
tection is a federal concern. 
CONCLUSION 
The Justice Department’s efforts to curtail gender bias in policing are best 
viewed against the backdrop of a deeply flawed jurisprudence of equal protec-
tion. Notwithstanding the absence of a developed legal theory of the protection 
model, the Justice Department has moved to implement its “pattern or prac-
tice” enforcement authority in a manner true to the origins of equal protection 
norms. 
For the first time, the Justice Department concluded that the police re-
sponse to sexual assault constituted an equal protection violation. In so doing, 
the Justice Department conceived the discrimination at issue in a manner con-
sonant with ideas that animated the Equal Protection Clause. As the Missoula 
findings underscore, “Because the vast majority of victims of sexual assault 
are women, MPD’s failure to adequately respond to reports of sexual assault 
has an unjustified disparate impact on women.” By deeming this fact to be of 
crucial importance, the Justice Department advanced a more robust interpreta-
tion of equal protection than the Court has yet to embrace. 
The Justice Department’s stance emanated from its factual findings, not 
only in Missoula, but also in other recent investigations, which revealed that 
the practice of gender-biased policing is not fairly reduced to the question of 
intent. Biases underlying underenforcement are implicit, not explicit; intersec-
tional not isolated; layered not unitary. Regardless, withholding protective re-
sources from a group of crime victims violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
This idea is not new; indeed it animated passage of the Clause. Placed in 
context, the reemergence of the protection model can be understood as a his-
torically iterated assertion of a federal obligation to protect civil rights. The 
protection model advances the equality of those whom the state would discrim-
inate against in enforcing the laws against violence. 
                                                                                                                           
The expected cost of § 14141, E, to any municipality is at least p, the probability per-
ceived by the municipality that its police department will be subject to a full investiga-
tion under § 14141 (regardless of the outcome) multiplied by c, the cost a municipality 
expects to incur as a result of that investigation. 
Id. 
 283 See supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text. 
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As often occurs, new practices inform theory. The Justice Department’s 
unfolding approach to law enforcement accountability provides the grounding 
for a more nuanced account of equal protection. By situating the underen-
forcement of rape law as a modern paradigm of unequal protection, we open 
lines of inquiry that bear directly on policing, but also extend to the state’s ob-
ligations beyond criminal law enforcement. 
The implementation of a lost strand of thought, equal protection as pro-
tection from violence, reframes important questions about an evolving consti-
tutional duty to protect. Beyond private violence, how expansive is the catego-
ry of harms requiring state protection? What is the baseline level of protection 
against which deviation is measured, and might it be consistent with, or even 
demand, a ratcheting down of the carceral state? As we reconstruct the mean-
ing of equal protection, do anti-subordination imperatives become newly sali-
ent? 
However these inquiries are resolved, they follow from a basic proposi-
tion: the denial of state protection is a hallmark of legal inequality. Federal in-
tervention in cases of pervasive underenforcement—in the gender violence 
context and in others—proceeds from this premise while refusing to concede 
its intractability. Future law reform, and the theory that seeks to advance it, 
should also accept this starting point. Without protection from violence, the 
promise of equality cannot but remain beyond reach. 
 
   
 
